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JEFFERSON MEETS COASE:
LAND-USE TORTS, LAW AND ECONOMICS,
AND NATURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Eric R. Claeys
This Article questions how well standard economic analysisjustifies the
land-use torts that Ronald Coase popularized in The Problem of Social
Cost. The Article compares standard economic analyses of these torts
against an interpretation that follows from the natural-rightsmorality that
informed the content of these torts in their formative years. The 'Jeffersonian" natural-rights morality predicts the contours of tort doctrine more
determinately and accurately than "Coasian"economic analysis.
The comparison teaches at least three important lessons. First,a significant swath of doctrine, Jeffersonian natural-rightsmorality explains and
justifies important tort doctrine quite determinately. Second, this naturalrights morality complements correctivejustice theory by the substantive rights
that tort's corrective-justicefeatures seek to rectify when wronged. Finally,
standardeconomic tort analysis cannot prescribe determinate results without
making simplifying assumptions more characteristic of moral philosophy
than of social science.
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INTRODUCTION

Economic analysis has taken over tort law and scholarship.
Before economic analysis came on to the scene, lawyers assumed that
tort law secured personal rights grounded in moral interests. Philosophical tort scholarship still tries to defend this commonsense view.
Yet over the last generation, tort's moral pretensions have taken the
academic equivalent of a drubbing. Even leading tort philosophers
concede, "frankly, . . . that the legal community has found various

economic approaches more persuasive or compelling than those
based on corrective justice," the main philosophical approach to tort.'
This perception seems convincing because economic analysis
claims it can explain the law more determinately than philosophical
1

Jules L.

Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA-

TIONS OF TORT LAW

53, 57 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
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analysis. When tort cases appeal to moral terms, economists say, their
arguments seem "mush-lacking in clear or persuasive guidelines for
determining what conduct counts as 'wrongful."' 2 Only economic
analysis, it seems, can claim an "impressive level of fit with case outcomes" and a "comparatively high degree of determinacy."3 As a
result, "philosophers have marveled in contemptuous amazement as
the apparently dead body of economic [legal] analysis took its seat at
the head of the legal academic table and reigned unchallenged as the
predominant theoretical mode of analysis in private law scholarship
and pedagogy."4
From a longer time horizon, however, this debate is surprising.
People often assume that American tort law used to have content
focused enough to be described as "individualistic"-that is, organized "to specify and protect individuals' rights to bodily integrity, freedom of movement, reputation, and property ownership."5 These
observers assume that the morality that used to inform the law was
determinate enough to generate predictably "individualistic" results.6
In addition, if economic criticisms are true, the various bodies of law
that have now merged into the field of "tort" were incoherent for several centuries until economists came along and tidied them up.7 It
may sound naive to say, but that claim seems a little presumptuous.
So do contemporary comparisons of tort economics and philosophy
fairly reflect the merits of tort doctrine, economics, and philosophy?
Or do they instead reflect passing academic prejudices?
No single article can voice such a doubt comprehensively across
the entirety of tort, and this Article will not try. But this Article can
suggest that the doubt is well grounded in reference to a fair point of
contact: land-use torts. "Land-use torts" refer to the grounds for liability for trespass to land, nuisance, and negligence claims involving an
accidental but trespassory invasion of land. They include cases about
cattle trampling on crops,8 doctors building offices near noxious bak-

2 WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS, at xlvii (2d ed. 2009).
3 Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REv. 287, 357 (2007).
4 Id. at 356-57.
5 John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 518 (2003).
6 See id. at 564.
7 See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-TruthsAbout Tort Law, 42 VAL. U. L.
REv. 1221 (2008) (discussing frequent observations about tort law, including its inability to be defined).
8 See infra notes 46-48, 292-98.
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ing machines,9 and trains emitting incendiary sparks onto crops or
haystack fields.10
In other words, land-use torts cover all the chestnuts that Ronald
Coase used to illustrate the lessons of his landmark article The Problem
of Social Cost' 1 (hereinafter "Social Cost") . Social Cost is the most-cited

law review article ever.' 2 It has contributed to many economists' general impression that philosophical argument seems "rigid" in its
attachment to a harm-benefit distinction, a "pristine idea of right colliding with wrong."13 Tort economists now routinely use fact patterns
involving cows, smokestack pollution, or train sparks to teach or to
build on the main lessons of Social Cost.1 4 If there is any set of cases
where "Coasian" tort analysis should demonstrate its explanatory superiority, the land-use torts treated in Social Cost belong in that set.
It is thus big news to learn that economic tort scholarship does
not explain foundational features of the rules regulating liability in
trespass, nuisance, and land-use negligence. The relevant liability
rules of those torts are better explained and justified as an application
of "American natural-rights morality." American natural-rights morality refers here to an amalgamated political morality that informed
American law and politics considerably from the founding of the
United States until 1920 and, to a lesser extent, since. According to
this morality, the law's overriding object is to secure to citizens the
natural rights to which they are entitled by general principles of natural law. This morality is "Jeffersonian" in the sense that it is a tolerably
well-articulated version of the theory of unalienable and natural rights
set forth in the Declaration of Independence. 1 5 This morality
9 See Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852, 852-53 (U.K.),
10 See LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 341 (1914).
11 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 29-34 (1960).
12 See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENr L.
REV. 751, 759 (1996).
13 Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of StrategicBehavior. RailroadSparks and the
Farmer,17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 30, 33 (1988).
14 See, e.g., ROBERT ELUCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 40 (1991) (calling cattle trespass "the subject of Coase's Parable of the Farmer and the Rancher"); RIcHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 3.6, 3.8, at 50-52, 61-63 (7th ed. 2007) (illus-

trating economic analysis of incompatible use disputes with sparks and smoke nuisance cases); Robert D. Cooter, Coase Theorem, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DicrIONARY
OF EcONOMics 457, 458 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (using train-sparks cases,
'which Coase made famous," as the sole example for illustrating the Coase Theorem).
15 Although Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson's personal views on morality were not necessarily representative of American common political morality in all respects. Nevertheless, as drafter of the Declaration,
Jefferson intended "[n]ot to find out new principles . . . but to place before mankind
the common sense of the subject" and to present "an expression of the American
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explains basic features of trespass, nuisance, and land-use-related negligence better than "Coasian" economic tort analysis. In the process,
Jeffersonian morality anticipates and highlights problematic features
of Coasian economic analysis.16
If this comparison is an accurate indicator, the philosophy-versuseconomics debate in tort has been off track for a generation, in at
least three important respects. First, if philosophical tort scholarship
suffers a bad reputation, this impression exists because too many
onlookers conflate tort philosophy with corrective justice. Corrective
justice is the species of practical moral philosophy determining in
what circumstances wrongs to a victim's rights should be annulled or
rectified.17 Corrective justice has much to teach about the institutional structure of tort-for example, why it pits an aggrieved "plaintiff' against an allegedly aggressive "defendant" in a suit to recover for
"wrongs." But, corrective justice (or, at least, the best-known aspects
of corrective justice) do not supply the content of those wrongs-particularly the scope of the plaintiffs rights, or the defendant's duties in
relation to those rights. That content comes instead from a controlling local political morality. American natural-rights morality therefore focuses and complements tort's corrective purposes.' 8
Second, existing philosophical tort scholarship has not done
enough to learn how American natural-rights morality informs the
moral content of particular torts.19 Since natural-rights principles
were influential in period when "tort" was coming together, it is quite
reasonable to suspect that these principles explain and justify foundational tort doctrines. It is also reasonable to suspect that contemporary judges may continue to be influenced by inchoate expressions of
the policy commitments associated with those principles. This Article
confirms both suspicions in relation to basic land-use torts. In the
process, American natural-rights morality also helps dispel a more
general unfounded impression, that theories of moral philosophy are
incapable of making tough-minded policy tradeoffs. American natural-rights morality makes the tradeoffs land-use tort law needs to get
up and running.
Finally, this Article suggests that conventional economic tort analysis is not capable of making those same tradeoffs-at least, not withmind." Letter from ThomasJefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), rprintedin 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 342, 343 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899). In this Article, "Jefferson" and "Jeffersonian" refer to that common sense.
16 See infra Parts III-IV.
17 See Coleman, supra note 1, at 53-56.
18 See infra Part II.B.
19 See infra Part III.
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out taking significant shortcuts. 20 The case comparison offered here
highlights a problematic aspect of standard economic tort analysis
that is often overlooked: To explain tort doctrine as determinately as
conventional wisdom supposes, economic tort analysis must make
informed hunches more characteristic of moral philosophy than of
social science. In the words of one leading introductory law and economics casebook, where lawyers and judges decide legal issues "by
consulting intuition and any available facts," economists use "scientific"
approaches including "mathematically precise theories (price theory
and game theory) and empirically sound methods (statistics and
econometrics). "21 But if the land-use torts provide an accurate point
of contact, these generalizations are overdrawn. Conventional economic tort analysis can provide precise accounts of parts of land-use
doctrines, but not of doctrines in their entirety. Or, if it does try to
render accounts of entire doctrines, such analysis makes assertionary
behavioral claims resembling what economists derisively call "intuitions" in judicial opinions. If the land-use torts are representative,
economic tort analysis can be scientific, and it can be relevant to doctrine, but it cannot have it both ways.
I.

THE RIvALRY BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND JUSTICE IN TORT

A.

The Economic Indictment

To set the stage, let us recount the general impressions that lead
scholars to assume that economics is more determinate than commonsense morality or philosophy in tort. Because Social Cost is frequently cited as an authority proving or illustrating these impressions,
I shall illustrate them especially with relevant passages from Social Cost.
I have already identified one: Theories of justice seem "mush" and
"lacking in clear or persuasive guidelines" for tort.2 2
Next, many lawyers assume with economists that tort common law
is facile. When the common law distinguishes between harms and
benefits or rights and injuries, the assumption goes, it does so less
subtly than economic analysis. Social Cost is often cited as an authority
here. After reviewing a long line of nuisance cases, Coase commented
that the judges relied often on distinctions "about as relevant as the
colour of the judge's eyes." 23 While restating the argument of Social
20 See infra Part IV.
21 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
(emphasis added).
22 FARNSWORTH & GRADv, supra note 2, at xlvii.
23 Coase, supra note 11, at 15.

EcoNoMics

3 (3d ed. 2000)
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Cost in a republication, Coase asserted that "there is no difference,
analytically, between rights such as those to determine how a piece of
land should be used and those, for example, which enable someone
in a given location to emit smoke." 24 In other words, rather than
employ traditional distinctions between benefits and harms, it is
instead more constructive to portray a dispute as a resource conflict
between competing and incompatible assets that inflict pairwise reciprocal externalities on one another. 25 This framework calls into question how the common law treats not only rights and wrongs but also
causation. If the parties are really inflicting pairwise reciprocal externalities on each other, both parties jointly cause any economic
losses. 26
Third, these impressions are contributed to by the Coase Theorem. Social Cost is understood to teach, as Coase puts it, that "under
perfect competition private and social costs will be equal."2 7 In Mitchell Polinsky's paraphrase, "If there are zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless of the choice of legal rule."2 8 On
the Theorem's assumptions, it does not really matter how the common
law assigns liability in a simple trespass or nuisance case. As long as
transaction costs are not prohibitively high, the parties will bargain
around liability to the efficient result. The Coase Theorem shifts the
focus of analysis. As Coase puts it, "the immediate question faced by
the courts is not what shall be done by whom but who has the legal
right to do what."29 To economists, it seems more precise to ask,
"what shall be done by whom?"
24 R.H. COASE, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND
THE LAw 1, 12 (1988).
25 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONomic ANALYSIS OF LAw 77 (2004)
(defining "externality" in the context of a land-use conflict to refer to any action that
"influences, or may influence with a probability, the well-being of another person, in
comparison to some standard of reference"); Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot
Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REv. 329, 343 (1995) ("It is more than thirty
years since Ronald Coase pointed out the absence of a coherent distinction between
courts abating a nuisance on behalf of a neighbor's use and providing an unpaid
benefit to that neighbor.").
26 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 11, at 13 ("The judges' contention, [in a case
between a man using a fireplace and a man walling off smoke from the chimney over
the fireplace,] that it was the man lighting the fires who alone caused the smoke
nuisance is true only if we assume that the wall is the given factor.").
27 COASE, supra note 24, at 14 (quoting GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE
113 (3d ed. 1966)).
28 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND ECONOMIcs 14 (3d ed.
2003).
29 Coase, supra note 11, at 15.
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Finally, conventional tort economic scholarship prescribes what
seems to be a more precise and quantitative method for resolving tort
disputes than those advocated by doctrine or tort philosophy. For
simplicity's sake, I shall refer to the conventional tort economic
approach as "accident law and economics." Accident law and economics prescribes that tort accident disputes be resolved consistent
with "productive efficiency." Accident law and economics tallies the
gains each of the affected parties generates by its land uses. It then
tallies all the relevant costs, including but not limited to: property
damage or business impairment caused by a neighbor's nuisance; payments to other parties under contracts not to inflict nuisances; damage payments, in compensation for nuisances already committed; and
transaction costs. Accident law and economics then focuses on the
differences between the joint gains and joint losses. Productive efficiency refers to an ideal state in which any change in the parties' levels
of production or precautions causes this difference to shrink.30
It should go without saying that this portrait of economic tort
analysis could be qualified in many respects. To begin with, accident
law and economics as defined herein does not automatically follow
from Social Cost. The article's main intention is to refute an assumption, conventional in 1960 among many economists, that the efficient
response to pollution is always to make the polluter pay taxes or damages to internalize the externalities it inflicts on other parties. 3 ' Social
Cost is therefore interested primarily in "[t] he influence of the law on
the working of the economic system"3 2 and not vice versa. Yet Social
Cost makes respectable the methodology of accident law and economics. Coase hypothesizes that the "legal system" may establish the "optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production which
it would bring," specifically by circumventing "the costs of reaching
the same result by altering and combining rights through the market."3 3 He praises American lawyers who "are aware ... of the reciprocal nature of the problem" and "take . .. economic implications into
30 The phrase "productive efficiency" comes from COOTER & ULEN, supra note 21,
at 12; see also POLINSKY, supra note 28, at 15 ("[T]he preferred legal rule is the rule
that minimizes the effects of transaction costs."); SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 80-83
(assuming that "the social goal is to maximize the sum of parties' utilities"); Coase,
supra note 11, at 16 ("One arrangement of rights may bring about a greater value of
production than any other.").
31 See Coase, supra note 11, at 1, 28 & n.35 (citing A.C. Picou, THE EcoNoMIcs OF
WELFARE 183 (4th ed. 1932)).
32 COASE, supra note 24, at 10.
33 Coase, supra note 11, at 16.

JEFFERSON MEETS COASE

20101

1387

account, along with other factors, in arriving at their decisions."3 4 He
also lets slip some of the condescension many law and economists feel
toward the common law, by describing judicial reasoning as "a little
odd."3 5 So, with possible apologies to Coase, we shall focus here on
the "Coasian Coase," the general lessons that accident law and economists have taken away from Social Cost.36
In addition, accident law and economics is a rough general category covering many different specialized economic analyses of torts.
Productive efficiency is an analytical device. It provides a launching
point for many different economic analyses. Yet even though these
analyses differ in many particulars, productive efficiency unifies their
inquiries in important foundational matters.3 7
Finally, "accident law and economics" should not be understood
to be a proxy for economic tort analysis generally. It should not be
confused with cheaper-cost-avoider economic tort analysis, 3 8 new institutional economics,39 behavioral law and economics, 40 or other refinements on or specialized applications of basic economic methodology.
It definitely should not be confused with scholarship by Richard
Epstein, 4 ' Henry Smith, 4 2 or other law and economists who explain
34 See id. at 19-20 & n.16 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 398-99 (2d ed. 1955) for the proposition that American nuisance law considers among other factors pollution's "utility and the harm which results").
35 See id. at 37.
36 See R.H. COASE, Notes on the Problems of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 157, 174 ("The world of zero transaction costs has
often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It
is the world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave."); accord Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism, "99 YALE L.J. 611 (1989).
37 See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 21, at 82-98; POSNER, supra note 14, at 53
("[Elfficiency is promoted by assigning the legal right to the party who would buy it
. . . if it were assigned initially to the other party."); SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 83-109
(comparing how polluter liability, bargaining, and legally mandated results each
might maximize the parties' joint net utility); see also Roy E. CORDATO, WELFARE EcoNOMICS AND EXTERNALITIES IN AN OPEN ENDED UNIVERSE

95 (1992) (" [M]ore compli-

cated analyses in the law and economics literature are still all, in one form or another,
applications of Coase's efficiency criteria.").
38 See, e.g., GUIDO CAI.ABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (2d ed. 1977).
39

See, e.g.,

HANDBOOK

OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL

ECONOMICS

(Claude M6nard &

Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005).
40 See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 3, at 359. See generally The New Chicago School: Myth or
Reality?, 5 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1998).
41 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS §§ 1.10, 8.2, 14.1-10, at 22-28, 189-91,
355-78 (1999); Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong with
Euclid, 5 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 277 (1996); Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of
Self-Help in Cyberspace, I J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 147, 152-59 (2005).
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property torts in reference to bright-line boundaries and strict rules of
scienter; I shall say a few words about their work in passing, but their
work is not our primary focus here. Accident law and economics
deserves pride of place. In tort casebooks and introductory textbooks,
accident law and economics is presented as hornbook law and economics. 4 3 It gets credit for bringing determinacy to tort. And it takes
credit for exposing the indeterminacy that supposedly exists in tort
doctrine and philosophy.
B. Explanatory Doubts
Yet it is surprisingly easy to puncture these impressions. One only
needs to consult the land-use torts on which Coase relied to illustrate
the lessons of Social Cost.
First, a trespass occurs when a defendant makes an act that
directly results in a physical invasion of the plaintiffs close. 4 4 In other
words, at common law, a "harm" occurs whenever the defendant penetrates the boundaries of the plaintiffs land-even if the penetration
does not damage the land. 4 5 Economically, there are two puzzles with
this rule. Social Cost articulates the first: When a rancher's cattle trespasses on a farmer's crops, it should not matter whether the rancher
compensates the farmer for the crop damage. 4 6 This question is easy
for accident law and economics to explain. Social Cost discusses the
rancher-farmer conflict on the assumption that transaction costs are
zero. 4 7 Once transaction costs are put back in the picture, it is less
costly for the ranchers to come to the farmer's land to bargain than it
is for the farmer to find them through their cows. 4 8
Trespass, however, poses a second puzzle: Why does the prima
facie case lack elements of causation or harm? There are few accident
law and economic explanations for this rule, and those that do exist
are not satisfying. For example, in a recent article, Lee Anne Fennell
assumes that the whole "point of exclusion from boundaries is to facil42

See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90

VA. L. REV. 965 (2004).

43
44

See supra note 37.
See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 67, 70-71 (W. Page
Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
45 See Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan. 1954); Giddings v.
Rogalewski, 158 N.W. 951, 953 (Mich. 1916); Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. &
Bat.) 371, 371 (1835); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 44, § 13, at 75.
46 Coase, supra note 11, at 1-8.
47 See id. at 2 ("[T]he operation of a pricing system is without cost.").
48 See ELLICKSON, supra note 14, at 186-87; Kenneth R. Vogel, The Coase Theorem
and CalforniaAnimal Trespass Law, 16 J. LEC. STUD. 149, 153-60 (1987).

2010]

JEFFERSON MEETS

COASE

1389

itate the effective matching of inputs with outcomes."4 9 The inputs
are productive activities; the outcomes include both those activities'
benefits and the accidents that they occasionally but inevitably generate. Fennell concludes from this functional premise that trespass
lacks causation or harm elements because "[b]oundary crossings ...
effectively puncture the containers that society has created for collecting risks and their associated outcomes."5 0 Assume for the moment
that Fennell's explanation is correct. Why does trespass law enforce
boundary rules even when a risk of harm does not lead to a harmful
accident?
Consider Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.5 1 Steenberg Homes asked
the Jacques for permission to tow a home across a vacant field they
owned, while the public road was blocked by a snow drift, so the company could complete a delivery on time. TheJacques refused to grant
permission under any circumstances because they believed that a
license might expose them to adverse possession.5 2 (Under black-letter adverse possession law, they were almost certainly wrong.) Steenberg Homes towed the home across their field anyway, knowing that
the Jacques objected, and caused no damage to the field.5 3 In Fennell's parlance, Steenberg Homes certainly punctured society's riskcollecting boundary rules. But Steenberg Homes could not be
blamed for the snowstorm, it was economically gainful for the company to perform its delivery contract, the Jacques had no serious reason for refusing passage, and their property was not damaged. A few
different regimes might be productively efficient: no liability; liability
compensated only by nominal damages; liability compensated by a
reasonable one-time crossing fee; or liability compensated by some
court-ordered profit-sharing arrangement.5 4 It would be productively
inefficient to award the Jacques not only nominal damages but also
$100,000 in punitive damages. But that is what the jury did,5 5 and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed-specifically to deter trespassers
from undermining the general principle that "actual harm occurs in
49 Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YAL L.J. 1400, 1438 (2007).
50 Id. at 1437.
51 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). Prominent property casebooks give facquesignificant treatment. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 87-88 (6th ed. 2006);
JOSEPH WILLAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAw 116 (4th ed. 2006).
52 See Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 157.
53 Id. Steenberg Homes' assistant manager instructed employees: "I don't give a
- what [Mr. Jacque] said, just get the home in there any way you can." Id. (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 On this last possibility, see Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1823, 1845-49 (2009).
55 Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 165-66.
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every trespass." 5 6 According to Fennell, ex ante, this holding deters
future boundary invasions.5 7 But her interpretation only begs the
question why the law needs to punish harmless boundary invasions
now to deter harmful ones later.
Next, consider how nuisance liability tracks the physical-invasion
test. In some pollution cases, the common law assigns nuisance liability where accident law and economics predicts and prescribes no liability. The classic illustration is the "coming to the nuisance" fact
pattern, in which a plaintiff develops previously unused land years
after the defendant first started running a dirty but productive business nearby. English and American common law by and large hold
that the business is liable regardless of how long it has operated in the
neighborhood. Coase dissected this position using Sturges v. Bridgman,5 8 a case between an early-moving baker and a late-developing
doctor. According to Coase, it did not matter whether or not the law
held the baker to be harming the doctor, because the parties would
bargain around legal liability as long as transaction costs were not too
high.5 9 The accident law and economic scholarship follows Coase in
different ways. Some articles suggest that the earlier builder should
be protected categorically,6 0 others that the law should examine on a
case by case basis which party acted less strategically. 6 1 These
approaches have seeped into some cases. 62 By and large, however, the
cases make the business liable even though it came to the neighborhood first.6 3
The physical-invasion test also bars causes of action for aesthetic
complaints and blockages of light. 6 4 Economically, it is hard to
56 Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
57 See Fennell, supra note 49, at 1431 & n.91 (citing facque to illustrate features of
remedy law, without explaining its implications for underlying trespass liability).
58 (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852 (U.K.).
59 See Coase, supra note 11, at 15-19.
60 See, e.g., William F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, 15
J.L. & ECON. 1, 106-13 (1973).
61 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 50-51 (1987) (providing an example of a rejection of the "coming to
the nuisance" doctrine and one upholding it); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights
and Liability Rules: TheEx Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 639 (2001);
Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the Nuisance,"9 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 558-61 (1980).
62 See, e.g., Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n,
337 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 1983).
63 See, e.g., Kellogg v. Vill. of Viola, 227 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1975).
64 See, e.g., Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1999).
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explain why negative externalities should be sorted depending on
whether they follow from a physical invasion. In Social Cost, Coase
assumed that his analysis applied the same way whether the defendant
was emitting smoke onto, or blocking sunlight from, the plaintiffs
land. 65 Because accident law and economics scholarship typically
defines "nuisance costs" to cover "harmful externalities" of all kinds,
eyesores emit negative externalities on neighbors on similar terms as
factory smoke. 66
Nevertheless, commonsense attitudes remain strongly suspicious
of economic conceptions of externalities. As Robert Ellickson
explains, a "layman would regard a smokestack ... as 'theft' of neighborhood enjoyment," but would "perceive quite differently . . . the

demolition of an architectural landmark or the construction of a
housing development on a beautiful vacant meadow."67 Nuisance
doctrine tracks commonsense perceptions. For example, in the
course of rejecting a nuisance suit to protect a solar-powered house's
access to sunlight, the California Court of Appeals contrasted "emissions of smoke affecting plaintiffs property" with the plaintiffs' "predicament," which the court described as "never [having] come under
the protection of private nuisance law, no matter what the harm to
plaintiff."68

Consider also the roles that scienter and interest-balancing play
in trespass and nuisance. Some accident law and economic authorities recommend that nuisance law employ principles of negligence. 6 9
65

See Coase, supra note 11, at 7-8 & n.6 (citing Fontainebleu Hotel Corp. v.

Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1959)).

66

See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications

for Environmental Regulation, 58 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 673, 678-80, 684-85 (2008)
(defining the interference in nuisance in reference to physical invasions, without considering that economic-externality analysis applies equally to noninvasive negative
externalities); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 21, at 40-41 (defining and exploring the concept of externalities); Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: RethinkingFundamental
Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REv. 1299, 1310 (1977) (illustrating a general approach to economic nuisance analysis with a fact pattern involving light glares between a race track
and a drive-in movie theater).
67 Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 728 (1973).
68 Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 703 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Wernke v.
Halas, 600 N.E.2d 117, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ("It may be the ugliest bird house in
Indiana, or it may merely be a toilet seat on a post. The distinction is irrelevant,
however; [the defendant's] tasteless decoration is merely an aesthetic annoyance
69 See, e.g., Hylton, supranote 66, at 681 ("[S]trict liability is desirable only when
the external costs of the actor's activity substantially exceed the external benefits associated with the actor's activity." (emphasis omitted)).
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In negligence, the element of breach of duty creates a doctrinal
placeholder in which to conduct "B v pL" precaution/loss analysis.
Nuisance could import the same analysis through the element that an
interference with a land use be unreasonable. 70 Other authorities
prescribe strict liability for unilateral accidents and negligence for
multi-lateral accidents. In simple cases, strict liability avoids the costs
of inquiring into reasonable care; in multi-party cases, negligence
reduces the perverse incentives one party's strict liability gives others
not to take sensible precautions on their own.7 1
In practice, however, trespass and nuisance employ strict liability
categorically, without distinguishing between one- and multiparty accidents. Trespass is often defined as an intentional tort. In practice,
however, courts water down the concept of "intent" to include intent
to commit the act causing the trespass regardless of whether the actor
knows it is a trespass. 72 A similar move happens in nuisance. When
intent is an element of nuisance, it is usually construed to cover intent
to commit a land use while substantially certain that the use will annoy
a neighbor.7 3 There certainly is negligence-based nuisance, 74 but the
law also preserves a strict-liability theory of nuisance as a backstop.75
Courts also resist, surprisingly often, the invitation to make nuisance's
"reasonableness" element a placeholder for economic cost-benefit
analysis. They prefer to focus on "the reasonableness of the interference and not on the use that is causing the interference."7 6
70

See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 14, § 3.8 at 63 ("The standard of reasonableness

[in private nuisance] involves comparing the cost to the polluter of abating the pollu-

tion with the lower of the cost to the victim of either tolerating the pollution or eliminating it himself."); Rabin, supra note 66, at 1316-31.
71 See, e.g., Hans-Bernd Schffer & Andreas Sch6nenberger, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND EcONOMICS 597, 607 (Boudewijn Bouckaert
& Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000); John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); see also POLINSKY, supra note 28, at 107-12 (applying this framework to pollution cases).
72 See, e.g., Burns Philip Food, Inc. v. Cavalea Cont'l Freight, Inc., 135 F.3d 526,
529 (7th Cir. 1998); Brown v. Dellinger, 355 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962);
Cleveland Park Club v. Perry, 165 A.2d 485, 488 (D.C. 1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 158(a) (1977) (defining intent in trespass to cover intent to enter land in
the possession of the plaintiff); JOHN C. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAw 776-77 (2008).
73 See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953).
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(b).
75 See id. § 822 cmt. b.
76

E.g., Pestey v. Cushman, 788 A.2d 496, 508 (Conn. 2002). To be fair, when

economists suggest that nuisance incorporates balancing, they are describing in large
part the way in which courts determine whether to enter an injunction abating the
nuisance. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 66, at 686-87 (discussing Boomer v. Ad.
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Of course, economic cost-benefit analysis could still seep into
land-use torts through the back door, by encouraging affirmative
defenses asking whether a land-owning plaintiff has invited harm on
herself. For example, according to economic scholarship on trainsparks cases, liability payments do and should vary depending on
whether land-owning plaintiffs take cost-justified precautions to keep
their land uses protected against the risk of sparks fires." In doctrine,
however, the common law does not use affirmative defenses in this
manner. Even making the necessary qualifications for exceptional
cases and minority rules, it is "canonical" that "if you hold a property
entitlement, then you should not be required to anticipate the possible wrongs or torts of another."7 8 In sparks cases, the general rule has
been to bar contributory negligence on the ground "[t] hat one's uses
of his property may be subject to the servitude of the wrongful use by
another of his property seems an anomaly."7 9 Courts also limit
assumption of risk as a defense against trespassory torts. In the 1974
case Marshall v. Ranne,80 Marshall was bitten while he was walking
from his farm house to his car by an ornery boar that had threatened
him on several previous occasions.8 1 Ranne argued (note that the
case was litigated in Texas) that Marshall assumed the risk of being
bitten because he did not shoot Ranne's boar when he had a
chance.8 2 This argument was rejected: "[T]here was no proof that
plaintiff had a free and voluntary choice, because he did not have a
free choice of alternatives. He had, instead, only a choice of evils,
both of which were wrongfully imposed upon him by the defendant."8 3 The opinion intuitively uses boundary principles to stop a
trespasser from making an inappropriate "your money or your life"
argument. But other cases allow plaintiffs'-misconduct defenses when
Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)). Nuisance does balance interests more
than trespass at the remedy stage-but not at the liability stage.
77 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-11 (1985); Grady, supra note 13, at 33-41.
78 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Dikes, Dams, and Vicious Hogs: Entitlement and Efficiency in
Tort Law, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 35 & n.20 (1989). Rose-Ackerman attributes this view
to Horace Wood's Law of Nuisance "'A party is not bound to expend a dollar or do
any act to secure for himself the exercise or enjoyment of a legal right of which he is
deprived by reason of the wrongful act of another.'" Rose-Ackerman, supra, at 25
(quoting HORACE WOOD, LAW OF NuIsANCE § 435 (3d ed. 1893)).
79 LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 349 (1914).
80 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974).
81 Id. at 260-61.
82 Id. at 257.
83 Id. at 260.
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defendant-owners impose "take it or leave" demands on plaintiff-licensees injured on their land.8 4
Now, in all of these doctrines, accident law and economists may
say that the common law is "rigid," missing "ambiguity," 5 or any of
many other synonyms for "not as sophisticated as the approach one
would take if one had learned more economics." Yet lawyers might
reasonably wonder whether these are scholars who cannot stop themselves from "perpetually enquiring into publick Affairs" even though
there is not "the least Analogy between" mathematics and politics. 8 6
And judges may wonder whether the prescriptions of accident law and
economics recounted in this Part confirm the "growing disjunction"
Chief Judge Harry Edwards noted between the interests of the legal
academy and the needs of the bar.8 7
II. AMERICAN NATURAL-RIGHTS MORALITY IN LAND-USE TORTS

A. American Natural-Rights Morality
In this Article, I explain the doctrines recounted in the last Part
using different account of law: American natural-rights morality. For
the purposes of this Article, "American natural-rights morality" refers
to a common political morality that amalgamates Anglo-American law
and several different philosophical and religious theories of liberty.
The amalgamation is restated explicitly and generally in the Declaration of Independence and many Founding Era state constitutions. I
hypothesize here that it served as a common political morality until at
least the end of the first third of the twentieth century.
B.

PoliticalMorality and CorrectiveJustice

At this point, one may reasonably wonder whether this claim has
already been made in philosophical tort scholarship. For example,
Stephen Perry has suggested that pre-1950 American tort law came
"close . . . to instantiating pure corrective justice."8 8 This claim is
accurate if understood with important implicit qualifications. Without those qualifications, the claim illustrates an important confusion.
84 See Gibson v. Beaver, 226 A.2d 273, 276 (Md. 1967).
85 Grady, supra note 13, at 30-33.
86 JONATHAN Swirr, GULLWVER's TRAvELs pt. III, ch. 2, at 167-69 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1999) (1726).
87 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MicH. L. REv. 34, 70 (1992).
88 Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: Correctivejustice, 67 IND. L.J. 381, 382
(1992).
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Corrective justice refers to a class of moral principles that justify
why and how wrongs by actors against victims should be annulled.8 9
Perry, Jules Coleman, Ernest Weinrib, and others have used corrective
justice to shift the terms of debate in tort. One part of the critique
relates to foundations: Law and economists are not really studying law,
because "whenever we are talking about the law we are not talking
about [economic] incentives but rather about the collective use of
force against some in the name of all"-a philosophical question
about "legitimate authority." 90 Another part of the critique focuses on
whether law and economics can explain broader issues of legal form
and architecture-why tort speaks of "plaintiffs" and "defendants," and
"rights" and "wrongs," and not "incompatible-resource users" and
"externalities." In addition, at least where economic theory has not
seeped into doctrine, tort law looks retrospectively to restore a status
quo that existed between two parties before an alleged wrongful act.
Economic analysis prefers to analyze the consequences of a rule prospectively and on everyone whose behavior might be altered by the
rule. 9 '
These insights are important, and they have enriched our understanding of tort. At the same time, these insights can be taken too far.
When Perry says that "pure corrective justice" can explain pre-1950
American law, absent important context, his words suggest that general principles of corrective justice can explain and prescribe specific
rules of tort doctrine with little or no supplementation. As Gregory
Keating has explained, however, that suggestion threatens to "put[]
the cart before the horse." 9 2
A full account of tort law presumes a fully developed primary theory of political morality. This theory must give an account of whether,
and in what circumstances, individuals are entitled to personal interests in security, reputation, liberty, property, or so on.9 3 In easy
89 See Steven Walt, Eliminating Correctivejustice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2006).
90 Jules L. Coleman, Some Reflections on Richard Brooks's "Efficient Performance"
Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 416, 421 (2007); see id. at 421-22.
91 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 374-75 (1992) [hereinafter
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS]; JuLEs L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 13-63
(2001); ERNEST P. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 22-83 (1995).
92 Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability and the Mitigation of Moral Luck, 2J. ETHics &
Soc. PHIL. 1, 11 (2006); see also Goldberg, supranote 7, at 1256 ("[T]he remedial tail
is wagging the substantive dog.").

93

Here and elsewhere, I use "interest" as it is used when referring to an "interest-

based theory of rights." Specifically, I use the term to refer to a moral justification for
an owner's having practical discretion in relation to a sphere of his life and using it to
make choices for his own flourishing in that sphere. So understood, an "interest"
confers on the bearer: a stake in having the discretion as an ingredient of his well-
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cases-say, an encroachment, with specific intent to dispossess the
owner of her land, which topples over the owner's house-the primary theory of morality is uncontroversial and easy to overlook. In
these cases, tort law seems to be mainly, or even wholly, corrective.
Yet corrective justice seems more problematic in a hard case-say, a
nuisance dispute about an ugly sculpture or blockage of sunlight.
Nuisance might accord with corrective justice if it imposed on an
owner a duty to rectify "harm" to his neighbor caused by offending
her artistic sensibilities or cutting off her light. But it also might
accord with corrective justice to say that a cause of action would
"harm" the owner by limiting his free and legitimate use of land.94
Which result better accords with corrective justice depends on a political choice not specified by corrective justice (or at least the core remedial aspects of corrective justice) : which delineation of property
rights is most just in relation to some combination of abstract justice
and principles of justice held in the controlling local political morality? As Keating correctly concludes, "The identification of those
actions which require correction takes precedence over their
correction."96
being; a psychological motivation and a moral responsibility to use the discretion for
his own well-being; a moral right to be free from and power to repel interferences
with his discretion; and a responsibility and duty not to exercise the discretion in
situations when the underlying justification ceases to apply. By the same token, the
interest's justification imposes correlative duties and liabilities on others and its limits
confer rights on them. See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
HARM TO OTHERS 33-35 (1984). I assume context will adequately warn readers when
I use "interest" in other senses. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 69 (referring
to utilitarian "interest balancing").
94 See Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1168
& n.56 (2006).
95 Legal philosophers debate where to situate the field of practical moral reasoning that declares and specifies the normative interests whose invasions tort rectifies.
One view holds that this field belongs to corrective justice. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra
note 91, at 70-73. On another view, this field belongs to distributive justice. SeeJohn
Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Correctivejustice (Univ. of Oxford,
Legal Research Paper No. 1/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538
342. I suspect but cannot prove here that the field sounds in a category of justice
separate from and lexically prior to the fields of distributive and corrective justice.
The precise categorization of this field of practical morality is too tangential to this
Article to be settled here. Readers only need to agree that the core remedial functions corrective justice assigns to tort cannot explain orjustify the differences between
different property interests; they may assign the norm-declaring functions of tort into

whichever field of justice they deem most appropriate.
96 Keating, supra note 92, at 11; cf Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Correctivejustice, 91 GEo. L.J. 695, 733-38 (2003) (suggesting that private rights of action
are prior in tort to corrective duties of repair).
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Different corrective-justice theorists have recognized this admonition to different extents. As the next Part shows, some scholarship has
asserted, without qualification, that general corrective justice principles can make predictions about specific doctrinal choices in tort.
That scholarship promises more of corrective justice than it can
deliver. In relation to that scholarship, this Article, therefore, clarifies
the proper bounds of torts' norm-declaring and -protecting functions
and its norm-rectifying functions.
Other scholars have distinguished more carefully between these
functions. For example, Coleman has acknowledged that "the content of rights derives from normative argument, not conceptual analysis," including corrective justice.9 7 Thus, when corrective justice
makes prescriptions in property disputes, it "builds on, or is layered
on, rights that already govern the relationship between the parties."9 8
In relation to that scholarship, this Article is mostly complementary; it
fills in a normative account of property rights on which torts' corrective aims are layered in the land-use torts.
C.

The Argument

Now that we have clarified the relation between corrective justice
(or its remedial core) and American natural-rights political morality,
let us explain the argument that follows. Part III shows why American
natural-rights morality explains and predicts the contours of basic
land-use law better than accident law and economics or correctivejustice theory (or its remedial core) in isolation. In the process, Part
III shows why American natural-rights morality's account of land-use
tort liability rules is at least normatively plausible. Let me restate these
claims more precisely. This Article does not claim that American natural-rights morality is the only political morality that could explain or
has influenced the doctrine; other theories of political morality may
converge with it in suggesting that owners deserve to enjoy a significant domain of autonomy over their land. Separately, contemporary
judges do not follow American natural-rights morality in land-use
cases completely. When I claim that American natural-rights morality
is influencing current law, I mean specifically that current law is still
borrowing implicitly on moral interests informed by behavioral and
prescriptive generalizations articulated explicitly in different sources
of American natural-rights morality. Most of the remaining discrepancies can be explained by a modified version of Chief Judge Edwards'
97 COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 91, at 338.
98 Jules L. Coleman, Correctivejustice & Property Rights, in
133 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994).
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"disjunction" thesis. 9 When judges use specialized terms of art, like
"property" or "rights," they follow usages and utilitarian vocabulary
from accident law and economics and other contributors to contemporary legal theory; when they focus on particular doctrinal questions,
however, they appeal to behavioral generalizations informed significantly by or at least in accord with American natural-rights morality.
Part IV then shows why accident law and economics does not adequately take account of the normative arguments imparted to the relevant law by American natural-rights morality. Here, the Article makes
a hypothetical normative claim: American natural-rights morality provides a convincing normative justification for the basic features of
land-use liability law only if one presumes that American naturalrights morality is normatively convincing generally. Many comprehensive criticisms could be and have been leveled at American naturalrights morality or its individual ingredients.1 0 0 It would take several
scholarly lifetimes to consider such criticisms. Nevertheless, similar
foundational objections could be leveled at many competent economic studies of law. Those studies finesse their criticisms by assuming: "To the extent that you care about efficiency as a value, you
should pay attention to the following conclusions." 0 1 This Article's
normative claims about American natural-rights morality are similarly
contingent.
III.

LAND-USE TORTS AND NATURAL-RiGHTS REGULATION

A.

The Natural Right to Labor

When American trespass and nuisance law define the possessory
interests they protect, both aim to secure to each owner a domain of
practical discretion in which he may choose freely how to use his land.
To appreciate this design, one must recover the intellectual context in
which pre-1900 American jurists reasoned. Although these jurists'
approach is sometimes described as "individualistic," 0 2 that adjective
99
100

See supra note 87.
For critiques of Lockean property theory, see, for example, G.A. COHEN, SELFOWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 175-94 (1995) (arguing that self-ownership cannot deliver the freedom it claims political society should secure); STEPHEN R. MUNZER,
A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254-91 (1990) (criticizing labor theory enough to reduce it to

being only one of several components of a pluralist justification for property); JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RicHT To PRIVATE PROPERTY 137-252 (1988) (concluding that labor-

desert theory can provide a specific but not a general right to property).
101 Richard Craswell, In that Case, What Is the Question?Economics and the Demands of
Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 906 (2003); see also id. at 906 (describing this type of
argument as "necessarily contingent").
102 Goldberg, supra note 5, at 520.

JEFFERSON MEETS COASE

20101

1399

does not explain the law's commitments except in easy cases. Before
he switched from rights theory to law and economics, Richard Epstein
defended an individualistic approach to nuisance on the basis of corrective justice. 103 But as Part II.B suggested, this argument claims
more from corrective-justice theory than it can deliver without
supplementation.
The key is to understand the scope of the moral rights to "enjoy"
and "use" in American natural-rights morality. The active use and
enjoyment of property is one of several manifestations of the natural
right of "labor" or "industry." Thus, when John Locke traces the
moral foundations of property in his Second Treatise, he insisted that
God gave the world "to the use of the industrious and rational, (and
labour was to be his title to it)," and that "[t] he measure of property,

nature has well set, by the extent of mens labour, and the conveniencies of life."' 04 As U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Paterson
explains in the 1795 case Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance05 :
Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its
security was one of the objects[ ] that induced them to unite in society. No man would become a member of a community, in which he
10 6
could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labor and industry.
For judges like Paterson, "labor" or "industry" has focus because
it has at least three characteristics. For one thing, labor is dynamic.
Locke refutes the suggestion that it might seem "strange .

.

. that the

Property of labour should be able to over-ballance the Community of
Land."1 07 He insists that it would
be but a very modest Computation to say, that of the Products of the
Earth useful to the Life of Man 9/10 are the effects of labour: nay, if
we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use ... in most of
10 8
them 99/100 are wholly to be put on the account of labour.
Separately, the interest in "labor" abstracts from the specific use
choices individual owners make. By focusing on man's common tendencies to acquire, create, and work productively, natural-rights
103 See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Correctivejustice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8J. LEG. STUD. 49, 50-53 (1979).
104 JOHN LocKE, The Second Treatise of Civil Governnent, in Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT § 36, at 190-91 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., Legal Classics Library 1994)
(1698) [hereinafter LocKE's SECOND TREATISE].

105 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
106
107
108
197.

Id. at 310.
supra note 104, § 40, at 195.
Id. Shortly after, Locke ups the fraction again, to 999/1000. See id. § 43, at

LocKE's SECOND TREATISE,
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morality tacitly refrains from comparing different legitimate uses of
property. James Wilson, a member of the first Congress and an early
U.S. Supreme Court Justice, amplifies a theme also in Locke and
James Madison's justifications for property. Reason must acknowledge that different individuals are endowed with many
degrees [and] many . .. varieties of human genius, human disposi-

tions, and human characters. One man has a turn for mechanicks;
another, for architecture; one paints; a second makes poems: this
excels in the arts of a military; the other, in those of civil life. To
account for these varieties of taste and character, is not easy; is, perhaps, impossible. 109
Last, the natural right to labor reflects a certain moderation, a
disposition to accept limits on what man cannot know. It may seem
dogmatic or overly optimistic for a theory of politics to appeal to any
"natural" claims of justice as if they can apply equally to all times,
places, and cultures. Yet an account of man's "natural" obligations
must start with and respect the natural impediments to his bettering
his condition. One can deduce these limitations from prominent
religious teaching, as necessary consequences of original sin and
man's inferiority to God.n1 0 Similar limitations can be deduced from
secular first principles. Indeed, much of the pre-1800 canon of moral
philosophy separated the study of moral affairs from the natural sciences for this very reason.1 1 1 Locke stresses that separation. In his
analysis, man operates in a "state of mediocrity," in which he can learn
only with 'judgment and opinion, not knowledge and certainty."1 12
These limits on knowledge are especially pronounced in relation to
moral ideas, which "are commonly more complex than those of the
figures ordinarily considered in mathematics." 13
Of Man as a Member of Society, in THE WORKS OF THE
L.L.D. 283, 307 (Bird Wilson ed., Bronson & Chauncey
1804); see LOCKE's SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 48, at 200-01; THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 45, 46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
110 See Genesis 1:1, 1:26-28, 2:7-9, 3:16-22; MICHAEL NOVAK, ON Two WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 35 (2002).
111 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, ch. 3, at 96-97 (Christopher
Rowe trans., 2002).
112 JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 645 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975) (1700) (emphases and upper-case lettering removed).
113 Id. at 550; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 37 at 192, 196 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1999) (stressing a "necessity of moderating . .. our expectations and
hopes from the efforts of human sagacity" in political science, because there "obscurity arises as well from the object itself as from the organ by which it is
contemplated").
109

1 JAMES WILSON,

HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON,
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These concerns limit and guide property regulation. In Federalist
10, Madison assumes that a "connection subsists between [man's] reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which
the latter will attach themselves."1 1 4 While this passage is often cited
as anticipating public-choice economics,' 1 5 in context it stresses how
hard it is to regulate property given the limits of human knowledge.
In many cases, partisan selfishness certainly overwhelms rational
inquiry. But perhaps more fundamentally, selfishness overwhelms
rational inquiry because such inquiry has little pure knowledge on
which to work. In practice, human "reason" makes many basic decisions relying not on hard scientific knowledge but on soft "opinions,"
which are distorted by human "passions" and especially the ones
encouraging "self-love." Given how little hard knowledge citizens
have in politics, it is usually better that the law refrain from regulating
assets directly and steer control to owners. Other things being equal,
the people with the greatest "self-love" in relation to assets generally
have the most informed opinions about them.
These prescriptions cooperate to make property seem simpleeven "formal," in the limited sense that simple forms are more useful.
To encourage all citizens' equal natural rights to labor, the law must
design property to make citizens secure so that they may recoup the
products of their labor without outside interference. Property, therefore, consists not so much of specific entitlements as a general domain
of practical discretion in relation to an external asset. That discretion
protects the owner's free choice how actively to use and enjoy the
asset in relation to his own individual needs. Chancellor James Kent
refers to this domain by suggesting that " [elvery individual has as
much freedom in the acquisition, use, and disposition of his property,
as is consistent with good order, and the reciprocal rights of
others."' 1 6
The portraits of "labor" and "property" I have sketched here do
not conform to "labor-desert" theory as it is often understood and
taught.' 17 According to conventional labor-desert theory, whenever
an actor labors on an external asset, he is morally entitled to extract
114 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 109, at 46.
115 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1328, 1330-31 (1994) (citing THE FEDERALIST No.
10 (James Madison)).
116 2 JAMEs KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 265 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al.
eds., 0. Halsted 1987) (1827).
117 I thank Nestor Davidson for encouraging me to consider this objection.
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the benefits that flow from that labor.' 18 This version of labor-desert
theory looks backward: An actor deserves to reap what he has sown
wherever he has sown.
By contrast, American natural-rights morality looks forward. It
holds that sowing is a valuable moral interest, and encourages legislators to write laws that enlarge different owners' parallel freedoms to
sow in different ways. This version of labor theory therefore sometimes protects a non-laboring owner's right to keep the fruits of a
laboring nonowner: "If I build my house with your axe and out of your
wood, I cannot gain a clear title to the house."1 19 In cases like this,
natural-rights labor theory makes an indirect consequentialist prediction: if legal rights are reasonably likely to encourage the greatest free
and concurrent labor by different citizens to different ends, the law
will protect labor more effectively by enforcing the legal rights of nonlaboring owners than it would by rewarding the labor of nonowners
on property they do not own. It is easy to appreciate this point when
one is speaking of one person's labor on another's axe and wood. It is
harder to appreciate when one owner labors on a neighbor's air column while operating a factory. Yet the basic principles remain the
same.
This rendition of labor theory may seem non-Lockean to some
readers. After all, Locke argues in section 27 of the Second Treatise.
"Whatsoever then [any man] removes out of the state that nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joyned
to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property."1 20
Yet this passage needs to be read in context of the rest of the Two
Treatises. Throughout the Treatises, Locke describes the external
world as something which man has "reason to make use of . . . to the

best advantage of life and convenience," or "the support and comfort
of [his] being."12' In context, then, Locke uses labor not to refer to "a
kind of substance, to be literally mixed or blended with an object, but
118 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 14 (6th ed. 2006) (introducing
labor-desert theory and suggesting several respects in which it is deficient).
119 A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LocKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 275 (1992).
120 LOCKE's SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 27, at 185, quoted in DUKEMINIER
ET AL., supra note 118, at 14.
121 LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supfa note 104, § 27, at 185; see also JOHN LOCKE,
The First Treatise of Civil Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note
104,

§

86 [hereinafter LOCKE'S FIRsT TREATISE] (arguing that God "directed [man] by

his senses and reason . . . to the use of those things, which were serviceable for his

subsistence, and given him as means of his preservation" and gave man a "right ... to
make use of those things that were necessary or useful to his being" (emphasis omitted)); LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104 § 46, at 198 ("The measure of property, nature has well set, by the extent of mens labour, and the conveniency of life
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as a kind of purposive activity aimed at satisfying needs or supplying
the conveniences of life."1 2 2 In addition, section 27 focuses on the
state of nature. The conventional reading assumes that the interests
owners enjoy in the state of nature carry forward to govern property
disputes in civil society without significant qualification. Read in their
entirety, The Two Treatises do not support such an assumption. In the
state of nature, each person owes others a duty to refrain from harming their property.123 In both state of nature and civil society, men are
equals. 2 4 In civil society, citizens may therefore reasonably expect
that the commonwealth will make its primary end to secure to themeach of them, on equal terms-their concurrent moral interests in
labor.12 5 Thus, even if an owner's factory is a productive use of his
land, the productivity does not necessarily give him a right to use the
neighbor's air column as a pollution repository.
The property rights that follow from labor theory so understood
are often called "rights to exclude" in case law and in conceptual philosophy. 126 There are two reasons to be careful with this conception.
First, as others' 2 7 and 1128 have shown elsewhere, the conceptual property interest is better described as a right to determine exclusively the
...

."); id. at 198 ("Man ...

had still in himself.. . that which made up the great part

of what he applyed to the Support or Comfort of his being . . . .").
122 SIMMONS, supra note 119, at 273; see also PETER C. MYERS, OUR ONLY STAR AND
COMPASS 129 (1999) (defining labor, "broadly conceived," as "the essential means
whereby we take responsibility for our lives"); Adam Mossoff, Locke's Labor Lost, 9 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 160 (2002) ("[T]he phrase 'mixing labor' is a ...
metaphor for productive activities."); A. John Simmons, Makers' Rights 1 (Feb. 16,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344432
(evaluating interpretations of Locke's theory "that labor is the original source of
exclusive property rights").
123 See LOCKE's SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 6, at 168-69.
124 See id. § 4, at 167.
125 See id. §§ 124, 134, at 261-62, 267. But see infra note 245.
126 JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAw 71 (1996) (defining property
rights in terms of a "right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the
interest we have in the use of things" (emphasis omitted)); see alsoJ.W. HARIMS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 13, 141-42 (1996) (defining property as including interests protected by trespassory protections).
127 See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO
L.J. 275, 278 (2008) (arguing that the exclusion-based approach fails to capture an
owner's agenda setting goal); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back
Together, 45 Aiuz. L. REv. 371, 377 (2003) (describing the "right to exclude" theory as
"essential but insufficient").
128 See Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Propertya Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEAT=L U. L.
REv. 617 (2009) (book review).
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use of an external asset.1 29 Consider a definition in an 1892 legal
encyclopedia: "property" means "that dominion or indefinite right of
user and disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular
things or subjects, and generally to the exclusion of all others."o3 0 A
"right to exclude" suggests that the owner enjoys a right to blockade
non-owners from encroaching on the boundaries of her property.
According to the 1892 definition, however, "exclusion" operates to
bar nonowners from interfering with the domain of free choice over
use-"dominion,"13 1 or an "indefinite right of user and disposition."
In some cases, A's right to exclude B from Wis not necessary to protect A's right to use W exclusive of B and others' interference. In
other cases, when the law says, "A has a right to exclude B from W," it
is using the "right to exclude" as coarse shorthand: "B's use violates
A's rights because it interferes with the domain of exclusive use determination the law assigns A."
Second, we must take care not to blow conceptual claims out of
proportion. In Part II.B, I explained why tort conceptualists must
resist the temptation to explain all of tort through corrective justice.
Property conceptualists must resist a similar temptation. Although the
"right of exclusive use determination" is more precise than the "right
to exclude," neither conception explains completely which rights
come with property. Both conceptions explain and justify property as
a domain of autonomy. Yet the autonomy has focus and limits, which
are supplied by normative judgments, embraced by a political community, spelling out generally which general uses most accord with property's functions and purposes. In a very wide cross-section of state
land-use tort cases, American natural-rights morality continues to
inform such judgments.

129 Penner uses a variation on the phrase in the text ("the interest in exclusively
determining the use of things") to describe the normative interest underlying property. See PENNER, supra note 126, at 49. Law and social norms, he argues, then cash
this right out into a right to exclude non-owners from things. See id. at 71. For reasons too complicated to develop here, I suspect Penner is creating a distinction
between normative interest and social/legal rights that does not exist in practice. See
Claeys, supra note 128, at 631 n.67.
130 19 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 284 (John Houston Merrill ed., 1892).
131 Accord LocKE's SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 26, at 185 ("[No body has
originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind ... ").
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The Plaintiffs Possessory Interest and the Defendant's Harmful Act

1. Boundary Rules and the Rights to Use and Enjoy
The understanding of labor sketched in the previous section generates different rules of ownership, control, and use for different species of property. In general, legal property rights often range from
(limited) rights of use to (unlimited) rights of possession and disposition.13 2 Use rights endow an owner with a right to continue to enjoy
the benefits of an asset she is using-only as long as she is using it, and
without giving her a right to destroy the substance of the asset.13 3
Water rights provide the prototypical example of use rights, and
understandably so. Water is used for a narrower set of private uses
than land is, and water is also used quite often for important public
needs like navigation. In temperate jurisdictions, at least, water is also
plentiful and can be acquired without strong property rights. In such
jurisdictions, most sources of water are left in commons, and those
that may be subject to privatization are subject to "use it or lose it"
conditions and reasonable-use restrictions.1 3 4
At the other end of the spectrum lie full rights of possession and
disposition. These rights give owners the right to possess and dispose
of things they own, even if they are not actually and presently using
those things.13 5 Fast land is covered under such rights. In a society
with any significant commerce, land can be deployed to a wide range
of uses, and many are quite resource- or cooperation-intensive. To
enlarge landowners' interests in using land purposefully for their own
plans, the law enforces exclusionary rights so "the [land] necessary for
carrying out our plans can be kept, managed, exchanged (etc.) as the
plans require."1 3 6
The law therefore organizes property rights in land in the first
instance around boundary rights not tied directly to owners' uses. As
Chief Justice Holt put it in a seminal 1703 opinion:
So if a man gives another a cuff on the ear, though it cost him
nothing, no not so much as a little diachylon, yet he shall have his
action, for it is a personal injury. So a man shall have an action
See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
See, e.g., WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE FOSTER LONGSDORF, THE CYCLOPEDIC
LAw DIcrIONARY 624 (Frank D. Moore ed., 3d ed. 1940) (defining jus utendias "[t] he
right to use property without destroying its substance").
134 See 2 B[ACKSTONE, supra note 132, at *14; JOHN W. JOHNSON, UNITED STATES
WATER LAw 35-43 (2009).
135 See SHUMAKER & LONCSDORF, supra note 133, at 618 (defining jus abutendi as
"the right to abuse property, or having full dominion over property").
136 SIMMONS, supra note 119, at 275.
132

133
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against another for riding over his ground, though it do him no
damage; for it is an invasion of his property, and the other has no
right to come there.' 3 7
In both the cuff and the riding, an unconsented touching is the law's
proxy for a moral principle that it is wrong for one party to interfere
with another party's domain of free choice.1 38 In each case, that standard of freedom is subject to qualification and revision. But the standard still matters. It provides a simple and clear way to translate into
real space the abstract moral principle, "equal liberty of action to use
property productively and purposefully for one's own individual
plans."
Let us recapitulate using Wesley Hohfeld's taxonomy of legal
rights.13 9 Once it has been determined that land should be reduced
to full rights of possession and disposition, an owner has a claim right
to be free from unconsented physical invasions and a reciprocal duty
not to inflict unconsented physical invasions on others.140 Both the
claim right and the duty are in rem (in Hohfeld's terminology, "multital" relations), which is to say that they attach to an indefinite class
covering everyone who does not own the land.14 1 To protect their
claim rights, owners also enjoy Hohfeldian powers to eject trespassers
and repel nuisances by self-help. The claim right, duty, and power all
reserve to individual owners a wide range of different land uses to
which they may apply their land. Each of those uses counts as a liberty, a Hohfeldian privilege.1 4 2 The owner also holds a more general
liberty to choose among these various specific liberties. By contrast,
each neighbor has an exposure, a Hohfeldian "no right," inasmuch as
he is powerless to veto objectionable but noninvasive liberty-uses chosen by the owner. 14 3 The claim right, the power, and (most of all) the
general liberty (and nonowners' in rem duty, liability, and exposures)
137 Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (1703) (opinion of Holt, C.J.).
138 Here and throughout, I abstract from qualifications imposed by private moralnuisance law, public-nuisance law, the law of private servitudes, and other issues not
directly implicated by a simple property-on-property dispute, sounding in private trespass, between two generally legitimate and productive uses of land.
139 See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-38
(Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 2000) (1919).
140 See id. at 38.
141 See id. at 73-74.
142 See id. at 38-39.
143 See id. at 39. Although Hohfeld assumed that there is "no single term available
to express the .. . conception" of the absence of a claim right, id., I assume that
"exposure" is adequate as such a term. See, e.g., Antonio Nicita et al., Towards an
Incomplete Theory of Property Rights 16 (May 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1067466.
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recognize that the owner has a wide realm of practical discretion in
which to determine how his land is used.
While Chief Judge Holt's dictum in Ashby presumes rather than
demonstrates such an understanding, it is quite explicit in foundational English legal sources and in American common law. Consider
how Sir William Blackstone defines trespass in Commentaries of the Law
of England:

[I]t signifies no more than an entry on another man's ground without a lawful authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property. For the right of meum and tuum, or
property in lands, being once established, it follows as a necessary
consequence, that this right must be exclusive; that is, that the
owner may retain to himself the sole use and occupation of his soil
144

2.

Trespass

This understanding explains the first puzzle identified in Part I.B:
why American land-use common law makes trespasses a trespass- or
rights-based cause of action and not a harm-based cause of action.
The core of trespass lies in the possessory interest-each owner's
moral interest in controlling his land exclusively, consistent with
neighbors enjoying like exclusive interests, all in the further interests
of determining the ends for which their lands are used, enjoyed, and
disposed of. The moral right shapes the possessory interest and the
harm in tort. In Blackstone's restatement, "every entry therefore
thereon without the owner's leave, and especially if contrary to his
express order, is a trespass or transgression." 4 5 This rule is just
because "much inconvenience may happen to the owner, before he
has an opportunity to forbid the entry."1 4 6 Here, "inconvenience" is
shorthand for "interference with the owner's indefinite range of possible uses, enjoyments, or dispositions." So, in subsequent American
law, "[e]very unauthorized intrusion upon the private premises of
another is a trespass, and to unlawfully invade lands in his possession
is 'to break and enter his close' and destroy his private and exclusive
possession."1 4 7
144
145
146
147

3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 132, at *209.
Id.
Id.
Giddings v. Rogalewski, 158 N.W. 951, 953 (Mich. 1916); see also THOMAS M.

CooLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT
OF CONTRAcr 64 (Rothman & Co. 1993) (1880) (justifying trespass's rights-based
structure because a "pecuniary injury requirement" would allow "the rights invaded
no protection" for "many of the most vexatious" trespasses).
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This understanding explains why courts continue to claim, as the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, that "actual
harm occurs in every trespass."14 8 Accident law and economics
focuses on the parties' likely particular uses of their lots. If one party's
specific use diminishes the value of the other's use, the former use
automatically cashes out as a harm to the latter. By contrast, the common law protects in each individual owner "use" in the form of a
realm of free action to choose among many possible uses. These
zones of free action transfer to each owner (not, as productive efficiency does, the trier of fact) discretion over how to prioritize the values of her and her neighbors' land uses to the extent they all hit her
where she lives. Trespass law also illustrates the confusion that follows
from speaking of a "right to exclude." The Jacque opinion affirms
punitive damages as an appropriate response to "the loss of the individual's right to exclude others from his or her property. "'4 Yet to
support this proposition, the court cites an older case declaring an
owner's "right to the exclusive enjoyment of his own property."1 5 0 Consider how Jacque interprets an analogy from an 1814 English punitivedamages precedent, Merest v. Harvey' 5 1:
Suppose a gentleman has a paved walk in his paddock, before his
window, and that a man intrudes and walks up and down before the
window of his house, and looks in while the owner is at dinner, is
the trespasser permitted to say 'here is a halfpenny for you which is
the full extent of the mischief I have done.' Would that be a com52
pensation? I cannot say that it would be.'
As the Jacque court reads this analogy, the eavesdropper's wrong consists of "the loss of the individual's right to exclude others from his or
her property."1 53 Yet the eavesdropper thought he could compensate
the owner for the right to exclude by paying him a half-penny. The

halfpenny seems insufficient because the owner's normative right conforms the "right to exclude" to his exclusive interest in using his paddock free from threats to his privacy.15 4
Jacque's holding seems especially extreme because Steenberg
Homes was using the Jacques' land productively, in unusual circum148 Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997).
149 Id. at 159.
150 Id. at 160 (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Lamoreux, 89 N.W. 880, 886 (Wis.
1902)).
151 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (1814).
152 Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 159 (quoting Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761
(1814) (opinion of Gibbs, C.J.)).
153 Id.
154 See Claeys, supra note 128, at 640-41; Katz, supra note 127, at 302-03.
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stances created not by Steenberg Homes' aggression but by a snowstorm. Even so, the holding secures owners' concurrent moral
interests in labor for indirect consequentialist reasons. By making
Steenberg Homes' conduct actionable and subject to punitive damages, the Jacque opinion claims to protect privacy1 55 and discourage
violent self-help.15 6 If people (or, at least, a significant minority of
people) "naturally" retaliate against intentional aggression, a contrary
holding would increase the risk of self-help and extra-legal retaliation. 15 7 To rigorous social scientists, these arguments are mere assertions. To moral philosophers, however, these citations just confirm
how judges manage Chief Judge Edwards' "disjunction" problem. In
practice, it is extremely difficult to say in rigorous social-science fashion whether ruling for the Jacques will protect privacy or reduce the
number of private venge feuds in close cases. Instead, the Jacque court
makes a reasonably educated practical judgment and rationalizes that
judgment in instrumentalist window dressing.15 8
3.

Nuisance

The same understanding explains, as accident law and economics
does not, why the possessory interest and the invasion at the core of
private nuisance also follow boundary rules. For a variety of reasons,
nuisance resists generalization and has a reputation for being an
"impenetrable jungle,"15 9 and our observations here will therefore not
be exhaustive. Yet even with these constraints, most garden-variety
nuisance disputes are informed by a principle of free use and enjoyment paralleling the conception of free control and enjoyment in
trespass.
To begin with, most commentators recognize that a nuisance suit
ordinarily requires some physical invasion.16 0 This requirement
155 Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 159.
156 See id. at 160-61.
157 Cf LocKE's SECOND TRFAISE, supra note 104, §§ 7-8, 87-88, at 169-70,
239-40 (justifying civil society on the ground that a commonwealth executes the laws
of nature more effectively than individuals can in the state of nature).
158 The facque court could have cited respectable "social norm" scholarship as partial corroboration for such a view. See, e.g., ELUiCKSON, supra note 14, at 40-81 (documenting how rural neighbors voluntarily resolve cattle-trespass disputes to protect the
victims of trespasses, regardless of whether legal entitlements are assigned to the trespass victims or the ranchers).
159 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 44, § 86, at 616.
160 See Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 220-21 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1999) (suggesting that nuisance and not trespass is the proper doctrinal harbor
for indirect, intangible invasions); SINGER, supra note 51, at 271.
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makes nuisance law draw on analogies to bodily cuffs, much as trespass does. Coming to the nuisance is especially revealing here. The
common law's position against coming to the nuisance strikes many
lay people as unfair. The late-moving developer seems to have more
flexibility to avoid the pollution than the early-building factory owner.
Nevertheless, in principle, nuisance law protects the developer's freedom to determine the future use of her land. It follows from that
principle and the basic boundary rule that the factory owner starts
taking the developer's development potential as soon as the pollution
starts. Consider this passage from Campbell v. Seaman,16 1 a standard
restatement of coming to the nuisance doctrine:
One cannot erect a nuisance upon his land adjoining vacant lands
owned by another and thus measurably control the uses to which
his neighbor's land may in the future be subjected.... [H]e cannot
place upon his land anything which the law would pronounce a nuisance, and thus compel his neighbor to leave his land vacant, or to
use it in such a way only as the neighboring nuisance will allow.16 2
Again, where accident law and economics focuses on the parties' specific uses, the common law focuses first on assigning and then on
securing to each owner a domain of practical discretion to determine
the uses to which her land may in the future be subjected. Indeed,
the coming to the nuisance fact pattern drives this point home dramatically. Until the developer develops, she has no specific ongoing
use-just development potential.
In the process, the common law also challenges the way in which
lay reactions and standard accident law and economics portray coming to the nuisance. Those views presume that, once the factory is
built, after-the-fact nuisance liability inefficiently forces him to abandon sunk building costs and move. But the common law focuses
attention on a parallel problem. Setting aside economic jargon, if
there is no nuisance liability, at the time when the factory owner is
deciding whether and how big to build, why doesn't the absence of
nuisance liability encourage the factory owner to build a bigger factory than is consistent with similar choices by future neighbors later?
If one presumes, as American natural-rights morality does, that different property uses are dynamic, heterogeneous, and all generally productive, better to protect equal concurrent use potential. The
physical-invasion test protects different concurrent uses while trying to
avoid rating them on their merits. By the same token, it protects uses
that come to the neighborhood at different times without giving any
161

63 N.Y. 568 (1876).

162

Id. at 584.
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owner priority "U ust because it happened that [he] arrived in the
area first."1 63
Coming to the nuisance also confirms how American naturalrights morality complements corrective justice. Note how the moral
grammar runs in Campbell: The factory owner "measurably control[s]
the uses to which his neighbor's land may in the future be subjected,"
and "compel[s] his neighbor to leave his land vacant, or to use it in
such way only as the neighboring nuisance will allow."164 Correctivejustice theorists might cite active verbs like "control" and "compel" as
proof that the factory owner is a moral aggressor and the neighbor the
moral victim. (Coase unwittingly conceded this point in Social Cost
when he described Sturges v. Bridgman by saying that the baker's
"machinery disturbed a doctor."1 65 ) But skeptics may say with equal
plausibility that the plaintiffs in these cases "sandbag" the defendants
by suing long after the latter's machinery is built and paid for. American natural-rights morality responds to this objection: "Compel" and
"disturb" make sense, and "sandbag" is inappropriate, because landownership comes with a substantive power to determine, and right to
be free in determining, the future use of land.
4.

Non-Nuisances

This understanding also helps explain the flip side of nuisance's physical-invasion requirement-the law's hostility toward sight, light, and
aesthetic nuisances. It would be quite easy for courts to encourage
sight nuisances under current doctrine. The Second Restatement of Torts
defines the plaintiffs use and enjoyment rights "in a broad sense," to
cover "the pleasure, comfort, and enjoyment that a person normally
derives from the occupancy of land." 166
Yet courts refuse to use language like the Restatement's to extend
nuisance law to most non-invasive annoyances-and when they refuse,
they appeal to inchoate arguments resembling those of American natural-rights morality. In one light-blockage case, a court balanced utili163 Kellogg v. Vill. of Viola, 227 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Wis. 1975).
164 Ensign v. Walls, 34 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Mich. 1948).
165 Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151, 165 (1973)
(quoting Coase, supra note 11, at 2). Note that Epstein has receded from this position and now holds that language cannot provide a focused account of legal rights
without a thorough utilitarian justification for the substance of such rights. See Richard A. Epstein, Causation-InContext: An Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 653, 657-58,
664-66 (1987).
166

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 821D

cmt. b (1977).

See generally, e.g.,

Tenn v. 889 Assocs., Ltd., 500 A.2d 366 (N.H. 1985); Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182
(Wis. 1982).
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ties under the Restatement of Torts, but then held that the trump utility
was "[a] landowner's right to use his property lawfully to meet his
legitimate needs," which the court called "a fundamental precept of a
free society."16 7 Some courts achieve the same result by making specific utilitarian policy arguments tracking how American natural-rights
morality describes property. One case argues, "Given our [populous
society's] myriad and disparate tastes, life styles, mores, and attitudes,
the availability of a judicial remedy for [aesthetic] complaints would
cause inexorable confusion."1 68 This argument tracks Wilson's,
Locke's, and Madison's insistence that property accommodates "diversity" of faculties and needs. 6 9 Other cases appreciate that simple
forms facilitate change:
Because every new construction project is bound to block someone's view of something, every landowner would be open to a claim
of nuisance. If the first property owner on the block were given an
enforceable right to unobstructed view over adjoining property, that
person would fix the setback line for future neighbors .... 170
These arguments do not follow directly from corrective justicewhich, as suggested in Part II.B, allows different communities to disagree about whether an ugly sculpture or house counts as a nuisance.
Nor do these arguments follow from accident law and economics,
which, as Part I.B suggested, logically applies the same analysis to visual externalities as it prescribes for pollution externalities. Rather,
courts assume, if owners want a general right of free use determination for their land, they must accept a correlative duty to abstain from
complaining about how others choose to use their own. Otherwise
each landowner would be subject to a dozen or more vetoes in landuse choices.
The nuisance cases covered in this section and the previous one
also highlight that "labor" sets priorities in a more subtle and forwardlooking fashion than it does in conventional labor-desert theory. Even
if a developer labors earnestly to build a factory in an undeveloped
neighborhood, his labor does not entitle him to obtain a de facto prescriptive easement before anyone else in the neighborhood has chosen his own land uses. Similarly, if a homeowner builds a solar-energy
heating system in his home while his neighbor sits by idly, the owner's
labor does not entitle him to a negative prescriptive easement to light.
If the labor were to give the owner a servitude on the neighbor's prop167 Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 704 (Ct. App. 1986).
168 Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. 1973).
169 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
170 Mohr v. Midas Realty Corp., 431 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Iowa 1988).
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erty, it would set a precedent giving landowners opportunities to veto
many kinds of future use or development next to their properties.
Conventional labor-desert theory still remains relevant-primarily at
the remedy stage. If a plaintiff has a valid claim for prima facie nuisance liability, the more she has cultivated her land, the more she will
be entitled to claim in damages for pollution disrupting her uses. Yet
the interest reflected in conventional labor-desert theory takes a back
set to the interest in labor as conceived in American natural-rights
morality. The former informs only the remedies within a broader
framework of prima facie liability rules designed to secure and enlarge
the latter.
C.

Causation

Because property consists of a domain of free and exclusive use, it
follows logically that causation should be unidirectional in trespass,
nuisance, and land-based negligence. The core of the tort-the
harm-is the interference an owner suffers to her discretion to determine the use or enjoyment of her land. Parties whose acts contribute
to that interference are deemed to cause the harm. While this relation is assumed in easy cases, it becomes explicit in theoretically
revealing cases. Campbell v. Seaman confirms as much by portraying
the early-moving brick maker as the agent who "measurably control [s]" the future development of the plaintiff's land, and who "compel [s]" the plaintiff "to leave his land vacant."17 1
Accident law and economists complain that such arguments
neither explain nor justify "any simple general theory of
nonreciprocity, which is needed to define the limits of Coase." 72 But
the arguments they criticize make far more sense when understood in
context of American natural-rights morality. It makes sense to keep
causation joint if one aims, as accident law and economists do, to maximize thejoint value of the two parties' conflicting uses. But causation
takes a different focus if one aims to protect parallel domains of freedom. In that context, cause focuses on the conduct of the party who
diminishes another party's free action.
Sparks cases illustrate the difference. In a sparks case, it is plausible to say that the plaintiff farmer should have moved his crops or
haystacks away from a known risk of sparks coming from the train.
Indeed, one nineteenth-century sparks case held, in anticipation of
Social Cost, that "the burning of said hay was the result of the acts and
171
172

Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 584 (1876).
Vogel, supra note 48, at 152.
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omissions of both the plaintiffs and the defendant." 7 3 But LeRoy Fibre,
a leading statement of the general approach, assumes as a matter of
fact that "[t]he negligence of the railroad was the immediate cause of
the destruction of the property."1 7 4 Both the farmer and the train
contribute to the accident as a matter of simple fact and as part of
productive-efficiency analysis. But the farmer enjoys discretion to use
his land free from trespassory invasions, which might generate accidents, which in turn might limit his free action to determine the
future use or enjoyment of his land. So LeRoy Fibre designates the
"immediate" cause of injury the action of the party who acted outside
the scope of its moral rights.17 5
D.

Scienter

American natural-rights morality also explains why the basic landuse torts strongly prefer strict liability over negligence. Any trespassory invasion of the land-faulty, intentional, or strict-threatens an
owner's entitlement to a domain of choice for secure use and enjoyment. When a landowner plans to build a house, she deserves security
that the law will rectify any accident that follows from such an invasion. In principle, the mere trespass creates a risk of accident against
which the owner should not need not plan.17 6 So, in trespass, if two
boys trespass onto a vacant house and accidentally burn it down, "the
purpose of civil law looks to compensation for the injured party
regardless of the intent on the part of the trespasser [s]. "177 Similarly,
in nuisance, certain kinds of pollution can be noxious without proof
of fault. In these cases,
it is no defense to show that [the polluting] business was conducted
in a reasonable and proper manner .... It is the interruption of such
enjoyment and the destruction of such comfort that furnishes the ground

of action, and it is no satisfaction to the injured party to be
informed that it might have been done with more aggravation.' 78
173 Kan. Pac. Ry. v. Brady, 17 Kan. 380, 386 (1877) (emphasis added).
174 LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 348 (1914)
(emphasis added).
175 For a more recent case, see Zimmer v. Stephenson, 403 P.2d 343, 346 (Wash.
1965).
176 This explanation differs from George Fletcher's in that the present analysis
requires reciprocity in risks to rights. See George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537, 540-41 (1972),
177 Cleveland Park Club v. Perry, 165 A.2d 485, 488 (D.C. 1960).
178 Pennoyer v. Allen, 14 N.W. 609, 613 (Wis. 1883) (emphasis added).
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Many lawyers assume that English law favors strict liability as the
dominant paradigm for accident cases1 79 but American law does
not.18 0 Some of the foundational American cases opt for negligence
over strict liability with natural-law and -rights arguments.18 1 These
cases anticipate contemporary scholarship, by corrective-justice theorists, concluding that strict liability is incompatible with the phenomenon of moral agency. Ernest Weinrib, for example, argues that
corrective justice has a built-in preference for negligence.1 82 Strict liability, he argues, puts the plaintiff in an unequal and superior position
to the defendant and builds on "the incoherent conception of
agency."18 3
Even so, normatively, strict-liability principles do and should govern in foundational land-use torts. Conceptually, in these torts, strict
liability accords with corrective justice. Properly construed, corrective
justice's remedial core specifies that tort does and should focus on
correcting wrongs by defendants. As Coleman explains, "[a] loss falls
within the ambit of corrective justice only if it is wrongful,"184 and
Weinrib himself elsewhere says that corrective justice requires that
5 Moral fault does not
tort be not negligence-based but "fault-based."18
always cash out into doctrinal negligence. As Coleman explains, "[i]f
causing a loss is a morally relevant fact about someone, then strict
liability may be preferable to fault liability."' 8 6 Corrective justice's
179 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 741-42 (Ex. 1865), affd, 1 L.R.
Exch. 265 (1866).
180 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 409-27 (1973);
MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 85-108
(1977). I am grateful to Peter Wiedenbeck and Richard Epstein for encouraging me
to consider the objection discussed in this paragraph.

181

Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873) ("By becoming a member of civi-

lized society, I am compelled to give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more
than a compensation from the surrender by every other man of the same rights, and
the security, advantage and protection which the laws give me. So, too, the general
rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed use and possession of my real
estate, and that I must so use my real estate as not to injure my neighbor, are much
modified by the exigencies of the social state.").
182 See WEINRIB, supra note 91, at 178-83 (approving of the rule of negligence
applied in Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (Comm. Pl. 1837)).
183 Id. at 179.
184 COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 91, at 361.
185 WEINRIB, supra note 91, at 190 (emphasis added).
186 COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 91, at 233. On this basis Ripstein
correctly explains why Rylands v. Fletcheris a case about fault even though it imposes a
legal regime of strict liability. See Arthur Ripstein, Tort Law in a LiberalState, 1 J. TORT
LAw, 1, 26-29 (2007). Ripstein, however, does not distinguish enough between fault
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remedial core cannot say whether causing a loss is a morally relevant
fact; it passes the buck on to the controlling political morality.
Notwithstanding cases suggesting otherwise, American naturalrights morality does not prescribe any one-size-fits-all rule regarding
scienter, either. It merely holds that, in different situations, legal doctrine should use whichever rules of scienter best secure or enlarge the
concurrent freedoms of all regulated actors to pursue their concurrent liberty and property interests. In simple land-use conflicts, strict
liability accomplishes this end more fairly than negligence. Imagine
that a plaintiff is enjoying his land quietly and passively, and that the
defendant, while enjoying her land, generates trespassory disturbances diminishing the plaintiffs enjoyment. Those disturbances create risks of accidents for the plaintiff. Without legal protection, the
plaintiff must either undertake self-help, change her preferred land
uses, or expect and budget for accidents. Whatever happens, the risks
of accident limit her freedom to determine the future use of her land.
If there are no qualifications, the disparity in risk is a morally relevant
fact about the defendant's land use.
That risk disparity makes strict liability generally appropriate in
land-use torts. Obviously, this logic explains why trespass and nuisance are generally strict torts. Even though neither has a fault
requirement, both apply only to conduct that is inherently morally
faulty even when the defendant acts carefully and without intent to
harm.
The same risk disparity helps explain many subtle variations in
negligence-based land-use torts. It explains why flood cases buck
American law's general preference for negligence in favor of Rylands
v. Fletcher 8 7-style strict liability.1 88 The water holder is morally culpable merely for creating a risk of flood, because the risk of flood by
itself creates a condition that neighbors must anticipate.
This approach also explains, as neither accident law and economics nor correctivejustice theory can, how scienter used to vary in
sparks cases. At common law, sparks cases generally required negliin doctrine, fault as conceived in corrective justice, and fault as prescribed by the
prevailing common political morality explaining the content of rights and duties.
187 1 L.R. Exch. 265 (1866).
188 See Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 741-42 (Ex. 1865), aff'd, 1 L.R.
Exch. 265 (1866); Jed H. Shugerman, Note, The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting
Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333,
342-46, 362-68 (2000); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Disasters, ElectedJudges, and American Tort Law 10-14 (Harv. Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship
Series, Paper 25, 2008), available at http://sr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1027&context=harvard-faculty.
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gence in the prima facie case.1 89 Even so, many state courts instituted
res ipsa loquitur or other doctrines to shift to the railroad the burden
to prove it was not negligent.19 0 When courts refrained from making
this move, legislatures often instructed their courts to use strict liability instead.19 1 In 1897, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed a constitutional property-rights challenge to one such law consistent with
passive-plaintiff/active-defendant logic:
When both parties are equally faultless, the legislature may properly
consider it to be just that the duty of insuring private property
against loss or injury caused by the use of dangerous instruments
should rest upon the railroad company, which employs the instruments and creates the peril for its own profit, rather than upon the
owner of the property, who has no control over or interest in those
instruments. 192
E. Affirmative Defenses
The moral interest in free use and enjoyment also explains why
the law presumes and enforces a distinction between "take it or leave
it" defenses and "your money or your life" defenses. In Hohfeldian
terms, the plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to an in rem claim right to be
free from trespassory invasions and a liberty to make use choices
within the parameters of that claim right. If, however, the defendant
may plead contributory negligence, the plaintiffs claim right is then
qualified by an exposure, in personam, whenever reasonable prudence requires the plaintiff to minimize the risk of accident in relation to the defendant's land use. A plaintiff may change her land use
to avoid a risk of accident, or she may continue using her land and
accept a risk of accident, but in either case her free use determination
is diminished. These implications help explain why courts refuse to
accept that a plaintiff makes a "voluntary choice" when he is forced to
choose between "facing [a] danger or surrendering his rights with
respect to his own real property."193
189 See LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 340
(1914); Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. 182, 187 (1876).
190 See, e.g., St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute R.R. Co. v. Funk, 85 Ill. 460, 461
(1877); Ruffner v. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton R.R., 34 Ohio St. 96, 97 (1877);
Burlington & Mo. R.R. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268, 272 (1876).
191 SeeJAMEs W. ELY,JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAw 123-25 & nn.37-39 (2001)
(citing nineteenth-century Michigan and Massachusetts legislative acts establishing
strict liability).
192 St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1, 26 (1897); see ELY, supra note 191, at
124.
193 Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. 1974).
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Sparks cases highlight the policy concerns particularly clearly. In
LeRoy Fibre,Justice McKenna calls it "an anomaly" to say "[t] hat one's
uses of his property may be subject to the servitude of the wrongful
use by another of his property."1 9 4 The landowner's free determination sets his entitlement; the trespassory sparks count as a "wrongful
use" of that entitlement; and an affirmative defense therefore establishes the "servitude" ratifying the taking of the entitlement. This
opinion also anticipates some of the difficulties that accident law and
economic analysis creates when it prescribes solutions focusing on two
parties' concurrent uses. In LeRoy Fibre, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes prefers to treat contributory negligence as a matter of degree,
better resolved through a case-by-case balancing test.19 5 But this
approach is impractical in a world with many owners with many heterogeneous uses: Is each plaintiffs use one "which the railroad must
have anticipated, and to which it hence owes a duty, which it does not
owe to other uses? And why?"' 96
F. Rights-Securing Qualifications
1. Qualifications and the Interest in Labor
The principles sketched thus far explain why trespass, nuisance,
and land-based negligence generally track bright-line boundary rules
without qualification. However, within limits, American natural-rights
morality allows such rules to be qualified. In simple cases, coarse
boundary rules enlarge owners' concurrent labor rights. In these
cases, "labor" reflects a broad but shallow moral interest in many different owners' being left alone, to determine how to apply their selfish and productive energies to reasonably useful and productive but
sharply-different needs. But in some situations, the law can help owners pursue different but concurrent property uses by ordering some
features of ownership-say, titling and conveyancing rules.19 7
At the same time, the natural law sets a moral baseline against
which particular common-law modifications are measured.
Lawmakers must be reasonably and practically certain that the
focused package really enlarges the affected parties' interests. The
U.S. Supreme Court used to articulate this standard, in substantive
due process cases, by asking whether legislative property regulations
194 LeRoy Fibre Co., 232 U.S. at 349.
195 Id. at 354 (Holmes, J., concurring).
196 Id. at 350 (majority opinion).
197 See 1 BLACKsTONE, supra note 132, at *134 (explaining how natural principles
of property justify specific "modifications" in local positive law for "translating it from
man to man").
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"secured an average reciprocity of advantage."19 8 Variations in trespass and nuisance may be justified if they secure to owners throughout the area as much or more freedom to use their property for their
likely intended uses than uniform boundary rules do.
2.

Nuisance

These principles go a long way in explaining why nuisance principles allow for more variation than trespass rules. Nuisance differs
from trespass in that the latter deals with substantial physical invasions, while the former usually deals with low-level, non-particulate
physical invasions.' 9 9 Nuisance is often defined as a direct interference with a landowner's use rights that causes harm and is unreasonable. Under this definition, nuisance requires the plaintiff to prove
three more elements than trespass besides the direct invasion of a
land right: causation, harm, and unreasonability. More generally,
where Jacqueand other cases make trespass protect owners' subjective
perceptions of control, use, and enjoyment, nuisance protects a more
objectively defined, one-size-fits-all domain of free action and use
determination.
To begin with, nuisance enlarges owners' use and enjoyment
interests when it shifts from the model of a trespass- or rights-based
tort to that of a harm-based tort. Ordinarily, unconsented smells,
noise, and smoke do not threaten an owner's use or enjoyment of
land as starkly as does an unconsented personal entry like the field
crossing in Jacque. The harm element limits the reach of nuisance, so
it focuses on smells and other disturbances that are sharp enough to
feel to the owner like trespasses. 20 0 Conversely, by shrinking neighbors' formal rights to exclude, the law frees owners to generate similar
smells, noise, and smoke of their own in the course of using and
enjoying their land. Each owner is freer to use and enjoy his own land
with an exposure to low-level smoke and a liberty to emit it than he
would have been with a broader claim right to veto smoke from neighbors' property.
198 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
199 See, e.g., Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 222 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1999) (finding that trespass requires physical invasion); Smith v. New Eng. Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 388 (Mass. 1930) (same).
200 J.E. Penner suggests that substantial pollution nuisances are tantamount to dispossessions. SeeJ.E. Penner, Nuisance and the Characterof the Neighbourhood, 5 J. ENVTL.
L. 1, 21-22 (1993). American natural-rights morality conceives of the harm slightly
differently. American natural-rights morality emphasizes, as Penner does not, property in "use." The former therefore conceives of the injury as a taking of use, distinct
from a dispossession of control but still severe enough to parallel such a dispossession.
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The "unreasonability" element of nuisance serves a similar function. Many authorities recommend that nuisance law scrutinize
closely the conduct of the defendant-especially the Second Restatement of Torts, which recommends that nuisance law balance all the factors relating to the social value of the defendant's land use against all
the factors relating to the social harm associated with the plaintiffs
loss of enjoyment. 20 1 In practice, however, at least at the liability
stage, 202 courts resist such inquiries surprisingly often. That is why, in
the 2002 decision Pestey v. Cushman,2 0s the Connecticut Supreme
Court insisted that the "crux of a common-law private nuisance cause
of action .

.

. is on the reasonableness of the inteference and not on the

use that is causing the interference."2 0 4 When the law focuses on the use,
it second-guesses the merits of the parties' competing land uses.
When it focuses on the defendant's interference, it focuses instead on
the question how the interference compares to other pollution in the
neighborhood. 2 05 This latter inquiry is less likely to generate controversy than any of the other realistic doctrinal possibilities. The Second
Restatement encourages the trier of fact to consider the fairly political
question which land use better fits local community values. Productive efficiency encourages the trier of fact to amass party-specific information about the money and subjective values of the relevant uses and
costs in play. By contrast, Pestey encourages the trier to focus on a
simpler and more apolitical question, whether physical pollution is
higher than the customary level in the neighborhood.
Of course, substantiality is just one of many factors relevant to
unreasonability, which often requires all-the-circumstances balancing.
Yet it is surprising how often substantiality trumps other factors in the
balance. In one 1982 case, a NewJersey appeals court announced that
nuisance law balances a wide range of factors, but then relied primarily on a finding that the noise pollution at issue was "louder than
others" in the neighborhood. 2 06
201 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827, 828 (1977).
202 The relative hardships are appropriately relevant after courts establish liability
and proceed to consider whether to enjoin a nuisance. SeeJeff L. Lewin, Boomer and
the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REv. 189, 206 &
nn.93-97 (1990); supra note 76.
203 788 A.2d 496 (Conn. 2002).
204 Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
205 See, e.g., id. (describing unreasonableness in terms of whether "the interference is beyond that which the plaintiff should bear, under all of the circumstances of
the particular case, without being compensated").
206 Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982).
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The same institutional logic also explains some of the more
important variations on the basic nuisance cause of action. Take the
locality rule. The locality rule makes the character of a neighborhood
an important factor among the many factors informing the
"unreasonability" of pollution. Noise and fumes that would be reasonable in an industrial district are unreasonable in a residential district.2 0 7 As with the harm and substantiality element, these rules also
narrow the formal right to exclude to enlarge the moral entitlement
to use and enjoy property. Without such variations, the law would
probably need a single, one-size-fits-all tolerance level for pollution.
With them, the law can distinguish among the pollution levels characteristic of industrial, agricultural, commercial, and residential neighborhoods. Even so, the locality rules avoid use-specific utilitybalancing; they instead crudely allow different uses within each neighborhood as long as the pollution levels are appropriate. Justice Cooley explains why this regime accords with natural property rights: Even
though "every man has a right to the exclusive and undisturbed enjoyment of his premises,

. .

. [olne man's comfort and enjoyment with

reference to his ownership of a parcel of land cannot be considered
by itself distinct from the desires and interests of his neighbors."2 08
The locality rule accepts that "the tastes, desires, judgments and interests of men differ as they do, and no rule of law can be just which, in
endeavoring to protect the interests and subserve the wishes of a complaining party, fails to have equal regard to the interests and wishes of
others."2 0 9
These examples also confirm that property's right to exclude is
parasitic on owners' normative interests in exclusive use determination. In the words of one prominent English opinion, nuisance
hardwires into the law a "give and take, live and let live" regime, to
enlarge for all owners "the common and ordinary use and occupation
of land."2 10 By itself, the right to exclude does not predict when and
in what circumstance one owner may exclude another's pollution.
207 See, e.g., id. at 1382; Jewett v. Deerhorn Enters., Inc., 575 P.2d 164, 166-68 (Or.
1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827(d), 828(b) (1977).
208 Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448, 452-53 (1871).
209 Id. at 454. Although space prevents a full explanation, similar principles also
explain why nuisance law protects owners only against what the land user of ordinary
sensibilities deems pollution-not what the eggshell plaintiff deems pollution. See,
e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 44, § 88, at 628.
210 Bamford v. Tumley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (1862) (opinion of Bramwell, J.)
(emphasis added). Similar principles explain why land-use negligence suits follow the
harm-based and not the trespass-based approach.
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Exclusion is tailored to accord with and enlarge regulated owners'
likely interests in productive use.
The same moral principles can also justify departing from boundary rules in the other direction-to make noninvasions nuisances in
some cases. Lateral-support doctrine defies boundary-driven conceptions of exclusion in trespass and nuisance.2 11 Lateral-support doctrine makes a landowner liable for subsidence only when the plaintiff
can show that the digging would have caused the land to collapse in
its natural state if his buildings had not been on it.212 This rule protects landowners by increasing each landowner's security that she may
enjoy "the use of his land for ordinary and legal purposes."218 Similarly, although the law normally refrains from making eyesores nuisances, it makes an exception when a neighbor builds the eyesore
maliciously and without productive benefit to himself.2 14 In such
cases,
the real evil consists in the occasional subjection of a landowner to
the impairment of the value of his land by the erection of a structure which substantially serves, and is intended to serve, no purpose
but to injure him in the enjoyment of his land; and so a new exception is made to the absolute power of disposition involved in the
ownership of land, as well as to the absolute submission involved in
that ownership to the chances of damage incident to the use by
each owner of his own land.

2 15

In other words, in lateral-support and spite cases, neighbors are
not excluded from the landowner's close. Instead, the landowner
enjoys a domain of free use and enjoyment exclusive of outside interference. Now, exclusion theorists might argue that spite-fence and

lateral-support rules are not in rem property rules but in personam
tort complements to property. Yet cases hold that spite fences "injure
and destroy the peace and comfort, and . . . damage the property, of
one's neighbor for no other than a wicked purpose, which in itself is,
or ought to be, unlawful."2 1 6 Similarly, the right to lateral support for
211 See Claeys, supra note 128, at 644.
212 See, e.g., Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 218, 221-22 (W. Va. 1982); see also 2 C.J.S.
Adjoining Landowners § 9 (West 2009) (discussing obligations of adjoining landowners
to provide lateral support).
213 Winn v. Abeles, 10 P. 443, 447 (Kan. 1886).
214 See Hullinger v. Prahl, 233 N.W.2d 584, 585 (S.D. 1975); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Adjoining Landowners § 111 (2005).
215 Whitlock v. Uhle, 53 A. 891, 892 (Conn. 1903) (emphasis added).
216 Burke v. Smith, 37 N.W. 838, 842 (Mich. 1888) (emphasis added); see also Sundowner v. King, 509 P.2d 785, 786 (Idaho 1973) (describing Burke as representing
"clearly the prevailing modern view").
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land in its natural state is deemed a "'property right"' that "accompanies the ownership and enjoyment of the land itself."2 17 By contrast, for
land threatened in its artificial state, the right to be free from careless
excavation is a tort duty-not in rem but in personam, and not a strict
but only fault-based duty.21 8
3.

Trespass

Although trespass law preserves sharper boundaries than nuisance, on occasion even it allows qualifications to boundary rules. For
example, when a domestic animal enters a neighbor's close without
permission, the neighbor suffers a trespass only if the animal causes
actual property damage 2 19 or if the animal's owner specifically intends
that the animal trespass. 2 20 These rules deviate from Jacque's general
presumption that "actual harm occurs in every trespass." 22 1 As Social
Cost suggests in its treatment of the rancher and the farmer, it is hard
for accident law and economics to explain why the law presumes trespasses in some cases but not in others. All the same, the animal trespass rules do for trespass what the harm and unreasonability elements
do for nuisance. In a community in which owners own both land and
cattle, the exceptions enlarge owners' free action to use their cattle in
cases in which the cattle do not seriously threaten their free action in
relation to their land.
By contrast, when cattle ownership ceases to overlap with landownership, the same principles may justify relaxing boundary rules.
Some American jurisdictions reversed such rules early in the nineteenth century, by giving animal owners an affirmative defense against
trespass if the plaintiff did not protect his land with a fence in good
working order. Many western states still have such "fence out"
regimes because there are many public lands and ranching is preva217

Sanders v. State Highway Comm'n, 508 P.2d 981, 987 (Kan. 1973) (quoting 2
REAL PROPERTY § 415, at 640 (1961)); id. at 990; see also Walker v. Strosnider, 67 S.E. 1087, 1091 (W.Va. 1910) (identifying property rights in restraints on
adjacent landowner conduct).
218 See Walker, 67 S.E. at 1090-91.
219 See, e.g., Griffin v. Martin, 7 Barb. 297 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1849); Stackpole v.
Healy, 16 Mass. 33 (1819); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 21 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 44,
§ 76, at 539 & nn.8-13.
220 See, e.g., Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81, 85 (1894); Monroe v. Cannon, 61 P.
863, 864-65 (Mont. 1900).
221 Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997).
THOMPSON ON
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lent.2 22 These rules operate similarly to nuisance's locality rules. 22 3
But if and when a substantial number of local landowners cease to
own and use productively roaming animals, the rationale for the locality rule vanishes. A fencing-out regime then "'manifestly increases the
burdens of the freeholders within the inclosure, who make objection
that their lands are to be turned into a public pasture"' unless they
"'fence any portion of their [own] lands which they may wish to cultivate.'"224 Contrary to Social Cost's treatment of cattle trespasses, owners' control and enjoyment provide sufficient reason to choose
between fence-in and fence-out regimes. And, in some tension with
"right to exclude" accounts of property, the right to exclude is not
sufficient by itself to predict when trespass relaxes boundaries in these
manner.22 5 The formal right to exclude does not acquire focus without piggybacking on a substantive account specifying whether ranging
or farming with give local owners more use out of their land.
For similar reasons, trespass law does not protect owners against
high-altitude overflights. For example, in the 1930 opinion Smith v.
New England Aircraft Co., 2 2 6 the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted
222 See, e.g., Garcia v. Sumrall, 121 P.2d 640, 644 (Ariz. 1942); Larson-Murphy v.
Steiner, 15 P.3d 1205, 1213 (Mont. 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 21 cmt. c.
223 See, e.g., Giffin, 7 Barb. at 304 ("In agricultural districts, and especially in new
countries, the public benefit resulting from permitting cattle, horses and sheep to run
at large, in highways, probably overbalances the increased expense of acquiring a title
to the road."); see also Myers v. Dodd, 9 Ind. 290, 291 (1857) (justifying a fence-out
regulation "as a kind of police regulation in respect to cattle, founded on their well
known propensity to rove"). But see Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165, 171 (1859)
(declaring a similar law to inflict a regulatory taking and distinguishing Griffin on the
ground that the right-of-way condemnation at issue in Griffin clearly dedicated grazing rights to the public).
224 Smith v. Bivens, 56 F. 352, 356 (C.C.D.S.C. 1893) (quoting Fort v. Goodwin, 15
S.E. 723, 726 (S.C. 1892)) (declaring a new state fencing-out statute unconstitutional
as a regulatory taking).

In

Smith, the fence-out law was especially objectionable

because it seems to have been passed largely at the prompting of a small number of
cattle ranchers who wanted continued cheap access to one owner's pasturage. See id.
at 353. Nevertheless, the court's reasoning does not rely on the special-interest politics. The court begins by protecting the pasture owner's "complete possession and use
of his own land," id., and then examines whether the law secures him a reciprocity of
advantage, see id. at 356-57.
225 See id. at 356.
226 170 N.E. 385 (Mass. 1930); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 194 (1934)
(stating that an entry over a person's land by another in an aircraft is privileged if it is
for a legitimate purpose and done in a reasonable manner). Smith uses state and
federal altitude regulations to abrogate owners' claims in trespass, and then uses substantive due process "reciprocity of advantage" principles to determine whether and
at what altitudes those regulations regulate or take property rights.
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that air travel is valuable "as a means of transportation of persons and
commodities."2 2 7 Those benefits enlarge owners' interests more than
their interests are restrained by losing the control of the air column
over their lands and above the five-hundred-foot regulatory minimum,
because "the possibility of [the landowner's] actual occupation and
separate enjoyment" of that air column "has through all periods of
private ownership of land been extremely limited."2 28 By contrast,
overflights below five-hundred feet threaten owners' "possible effective possession" and "create in the ordinary mind a sense of infringement of property rights which cannot be minimized or effaced."2
In Social Cost, Coase uses overflight cases like Smith to emphasize
that all legal rights and responsibilities are products of policy choices
intended to enlarge the public welfare.2 30 In context, this suggestion
criticizes common law trespass case law, on the ground that it makes
rights claims that do not take sufficient account of the public consequences of legal rules. Coase assumes that public policy can efficiently promote specific, first-order act-utilitarian policy goals-like
the efficient development and consumption of air travel.
If one were to cash out Smith's moral principles in instrumentalist
terms, the public welfare is better understood in terms of a more general, second-order, indirect consequentialist goal-the protection of
individual citizens' free exercise of the discretionary choice they get
from their rights. So in overflight cases, the law may be reformed to
encourage air travel, but only if it is reasonably and practically certain
that the reforms will confer on landowners more free action from new
air travel and commerce than they would otherwise have from using
the slices of their air columns at cruising altitudes. 23 1 This proviso is
easy to satisfy in overflight cases, because no or hardly any owners can
claim any real interest in exploiting air columns above overflight
paths. Yet the proviso matters, because it hardwires into law some
skepticism. If the general society is so certain it can accurately forecast the specific policies its citizenry will want, it will not object to com227 Smith, 170 N.E. at 388.
228 Id. at 389.
229 Id. at 393.
230 Coase, supra note 11, at 26-28. While Coase cites and treats other overflight
cases, Smith justifies the case law's preferences in closest alignment with American
natural-rights morality.
231 See, e.g., Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (1862) (opinion of Bramwell,J.) ("[W]henever a thing is for the public benefit, properly understood, ... the
loss to the individuals of the public who lose will bear compensation out of the gains
of those who gain. It is for the public benefit there should be railways, but it would
not be unless the gain of having the railway was sufficient to compensate the loss
occasioned by the use of the land required for its site .... ).
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pensating the individuals whose individual rights will be disrupted by
that policy. On this view, the rules of trespass are structured to consider public consequences-but they conceive of "public consequences" in more pessimistic terms than is often presumed in
instrumentalist policy analysis.
4.

The Philosophical Bases for Reordering Civil Property Rights

These standards for qualifying rights are subject to many possible
criticisms. For example, Robert Bone has portrayed pre-1900 nuisance law as oscillating between two extremes: Some cases claim that
property rights are "absolute" and brook no qualifications, while
others qualify rights heavily because all rights are "relative" to contextual social factors. 23 2 One must be careful here to avoid anachronisms. In some contexts, nineteenth-century legal discourse did use
"absolute" and "relative" consistent with modern usage, in which the
former is a synonym and the latter an antonym for "not subject to any
legal diminution or adjustment."23 3 In other contexts, however, nineteenth-century American law used "absolute" to refer to a right that
arises solely out of a person's own individual liberty and his selfregarding faculties-say, personal security or reputation. A "relative"
right, by contrast, refers to a right that arises out of the social interactions of two or more people-say, marriage, or the legal consequences
of an employment relation. 23 4 According to these definitions, property is a hybrid right. The natural right to labor is absolute, but labor
cannot be secured in relation to property without regulations establishing an owner's positive-law rights "relative" to neighbors in society.
In simple pollution cases, the law preoccupies itself with threats to the
plaintiff's "absolute" interests in use and enjoyment. But in localityrule cases and other cases where qualifications are appropriate, the
232 See Robert Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law:
1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (1985) (contrasting "absolute" and "social
and relational" rights).
233 Compare Eaton v. Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 512 (1872)
("Then, he had an unlimited right; now, he has only a limited right. His absolute
ownership has been reduced to a qualified ownership."), with Thompson v. Androscoggin River Improvement Co., 54 N.H. 545, 551 (1874) ("Property in land must be
considered, for many purposes, not as an absolute, unrestricted dominion, but as an
aggregation of qualified privileges . . . .").
234 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 132, at *119-24; 2 KErT, supTa note 116, at 1
(defining "absolute" as "being such as belong to individuals in a single unconnected
state" and "relative" as "being those which arise from the civil and domestic relations"); id. at 10-12, 33 (providing examples).
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doctrines are made "relative" to enlarge neighbors' concurrent, free,
and equal uses of their property.
Separately, one could object that the law may not justify forced
transfers of legal rights without undermining the philosophical bases
of natural property rights. 235 For example, when Richard Epstein
defended nuisance relying on rights theory, he insisted: "Individual
rights do not rest upon foundations so insecure that any fresh wave of
empirical research may displace them."2 36 Yet he then proceeded to
relax the strict boundary rules he drew from corrective justice by using
"utilitarian" limitations based on the principle of implicit in-kind compensation.2 3 7 Many apply to Epstein's approach what I have called
elsewhere a "deontology trap"23 8 : Epstein's account of rights makes no
sense unless what he calls corrective-justice rights are based in deontological theories of morality; but deontological rights may never be sacrificed and remain morally justifiable; and Epstein therefore stumbles
into philosophical incoherence by limiting such rights to accomplish
utilitarian side goals. 239
This criticism is extremely difficult to pin down. "Deontology" is
used in too many different senses in too many different contexts for
there to be one commonly-accepted meaning. 24 0 To keep the discussion manageable, let us focus on three especially prominent definitions. One states a nonappropriation norm: "Do not appropriate
another's existence without her consent to make yourself better off
than you would be had she not existed, and her worse off than she
would be had you not existed." 2 41 If that is what "deontology" means,
the factors that make natural rights relative (in the sense just
explained) also make it not deontological.
235 I am grateful to Larry May and Dennis Tuchler for encouraging me to consider
the objection in this section, and to Michael Shapiro and Dennis Klimchuk for help
in fashioning my response.
236 Epstein, supra note 103, at 75.
237 See id. at 57-58, 90-91.
238 Eric R. Claeys, Virtue Ethics and Rights Politics in American Property Law, 94 CoRL. REV. 889, 897-901 (2009). The coverage in that article, however, did not
consider enough how "deontology" is used in John Rawls's political philosophy, as is
NELL

considered here infra text accompanying notes 242-244.
239 See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
(2002).

WELFARE

52-81

240 Barbara Herman identifies at least six different prominent definitions of
"deontology" in different scholarly quarters. See BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF

209-10 & nn. 1, 5 (1993). Her list is not exhaustive; it does not
cover all the definitions I discuss here in the text.
241 Larry Alexander, Is Morality Like the Tax Code?, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1839, 1845
(1997) (emphasis omitted).
MORAL JUDGMENT
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In political philosophy, however, "deontology" can also refer to
any moral theory whose prescriptions about the right or the just are
lexically prior to its prescriptions about the good. Paraphrased
roughly, actors must determine what justice requires, and then dojustice or abstain from injustice, before they determine and do what produces good consequences. 242 John Rawls popularized this usage; he
and his followers assume that "good consequences" refer to social welfare "as defined independently of any moral concepts or principles."2 43 This sense is the one by which a policymaker asks whether it
is good to abandon the ad coelum rule for overflights by focusing on
whether air travel will generate commerce and not considering seriously how much air travel will interfere with under-flight owners' free
use of their land.
By Rawls's usage, most if not all of the theories contributing to
American natural-rights morality are deontological-but they reject
the terms of Rawls's definition in ways that anticipate and finesse the
deontology trap. The moral principles that endow each owner with
liberty of action also impose on him correlative duties to respect the
like rights of others and the common good. Yet the common good
consists in turn of all citizens' concurrent exercise of their moral
interests. 2 44 In a practical sense, then, the right and the just are lexically prior to the (conventional, act-utilitarian, morality-independent)
good. Since the common good consists primarily of respect for liberty
and property, the political community needs to make sure it is holding owners harmless before it gives airlines servitudes in their air columns. In a principled sense, however, most contributors to American
natural-rights morality reject the dichotomy Rawls assumes between
the right and the good. For most practical purposes, those contributors recast the common good to be coterminous with the right.24 5
See JOHN RTwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1974).
Samuel Freeman, Utilitarianism,Deontology, and the Prioiity of Right, 23 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 313, 323 (1994); see also RAWLS, supra note 242, at 30-32 (equating "the
good" with the good as understood in conventional act utilitarianism).
244 See, e.g., 1 WILSON, supra note 109, at 302 (describing "[t]he wisest and most
benign constitution of a rational and moral system" as one in which "the degree of
private affection, most useful to the individual, is, at the same time, consistent with
the greatest interest of the system" and vice versa). This characteristic is sometimes
called "compossibility." See Fred D. Miller, Jr., Virtue and Rights in Aristotle's Best
Regime, in VALUES AND VIRTUES 67, 88 (Timothy Chappell ed., 2006).
245 There are limits to the statement in the text. For example, for practical purposes, Locke conceives of the common good as the aggregation of the individual
interests of all citizens, but strictly speaking the interests of individuals are part of the
common good only "as far as will consist with the publick good." LOCKE'S SECOND
TREATISE, supranote 104, § 134, at 267-68. For example, the sovereign acts in accord
242
243
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Thus, Coase and other act-utilitarians have it wrong to the extent they
assume that public policy only requires the government to ask
whether air travel benefits the public without subtracting for its harms
to the rights of under-flight owners.
By contrast, in ethical philosophy, "deontology" is used often to
classify normative theories by their fundamental phenomena or ends.
In this usage, deontological theories assume that the rightness of a
given action is judged fundamentally by whether or not it conforms to
a moral duty. Deontological theories in this sense are set apart from
consequentialist theories (in which the ultimate foundations for
moral justifications are good external consequences) and virtue ethics
theories (in which the foundations focus on how actions influence the
character of the actor). If a deontological theory so understood
makes prescriptions about external consequences or internal character formation, it does so because (and only to the extent that) consequences and character help actors do what they are already required
to do by the obligatoriness of moral duty.246
When "deontology" is used in this sense, it is impossible to draw

generalizations about American natural-rights morality as a whole.
Different contributing theories rest on different normative foundations. Property rights may be justified on deontological grounds, for
example, because we respond to divine commands or a moral sense,
both of which tell us that we may use the bounty of the natural world
for our enjoyment provided that we respect the like rights of
others. 24 7 Property rights may be justified on consequentialist
grounds, for example, because they secure to citizens naturally-useful
external goods and diminish social strife over resources. Property
rights may also be justified on virtue-based grounds. They discourage
greed and tyrannical tendencies, encourage industry, civility, moderation, and self-mastery, and they facilitate the cultivation of many social
and intellectual virtues.2 48
Yet even if different contributing theories start from different
normative foundations, all of the theories may adjust legal rights consequentially without slipping into gross inconsistency or incomprewith the common good if it tears down the house of an innocent owner to stop an
oncoming fire. See id. § 159, at 291-92. So if Rawls's deontology/teleology distinction states a dichotomy, Locke is a teleologist; if it states a continuum, Locke inclines
far closer to the deontological end than the teleological end.
246 See, e.g., ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 1 (1999); Lawrence C.
Becker, The Neglect of Virtue, 85 ETHICS 110, 110-11 & n.1 (1975).
247 See, e.g., 1 WILsoN, supra note 109, at 114-25.
248 See, e.g., 2 KENT, supra note 116, at 256; see also Claeys, supra note 238, at
910-16, 928-33 (reviewing the merits of virtue-based theories).
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hensibility. As Rawls explains, it is uncharitable to insist that a theory
of morality cannot "take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy." 2 4 9 By conceiving of the common good as an aggregation of individual citizens'
concurrent moral interests in liberty of action, American naturalrights morality prevents separation between moral rights on one hand
and moral responsibilities and the common good on the other. It
explains why law may consequentially qualify private rights in different
situations. Neither the variations nor the regard for consequences
makes the natural right to labor any less moral an interest.

IV.
A.

ACCIDENT LAW AND ECONOMIcs RECONSIDERED

The Tension Between Private Orderingand Expert Supervision

So American natural-rights morality is not obviously philosophically incoherent. It certainly does not generate mush. It explains
many general features and specific rules in land-use torts that accident
law and economics gets wrong. Yet accident law and economics has
not been considered on its normative merits. Perhaps accident law
and economics makes normative criticisms not adequately considered
in American natural-rights morality.
Obviously, this Article cannot cover this possibility exhaustively.
There are three central issues. One might ask whether law and economics explains legal doctrine in terms that are foundational in the
law from its own perspective. 2 5 0 If that issue is paramount, there is no
point in engaging law and economics at all.
Alternatively, one might ask whether one of the two approaches
frames inquiries into normative value better-say, whether individual
freedom or social welfare provides a more satisfying touchstone for
normative analysis. Surprisingly, however, differences over these questions are not particularly important to what divides American naturalrights morality from accident law and economics. For practical purposes here, the central issue is how the two approaches handle the
challenges that arise when triers of fact and lawmakers lack complete
information. Different normative theories of social control disagree
about how much expert-driven regulation can regulate economic life.
This difference cuts across different theories of economics and also
different theories of philosophy. American natural-rights theory
249

RAwLS, supra note 242, at 30; see also Freeman, supra note 243, at 348 ("No

significant position has ever held consequences do not matter in ascertaining what is
right to do.").

250

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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keeps legal regulation to a minimum, but other theories ofjustice may
prescribe thatjudges assign entitlements on a case-by-case basis to promote justice or to do justice.2 5 1 A similar debate plays out in law and
economics.
There is an irony here. American natural-rights morality fell into
desuetude in large part as lawyers gradually assumed that its prescriptions were too simple to apply to the complex industrial economy the
United States developed in the early twentieth century. 25 2 That general perception helped to justify approaches to legal and social planning more centralized than seems realistic within American naturalrights morality. Yet even as that morality was being displaced, social
scientists who had no reason to know about it started to raise serious
doubts about centralized planning-relying to a large degree on generalizations about human behavior strikingly similar to American natural-rights morality's. For example, Friedrich Hayek concluded
economics should focus on the fundamental "problem of how to
secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals
know." 253 In fact, Hayek worried especially that the "character of the
fundamental problem has ... been rather obscured than illuminated
by many of the recent refinements of economic theory, particularly by
many of the uses made of mathematics." 254 It is fair to wonder
whether accident law and economics makes refinements of the type
that worried Hayek.
B.

The HistoricalPedigree of Accident Law and Economics

There are at least three ways to appreciate the problem. One is
genealogical. Accident law and economics describes its own origins in
the period when academics were sweeping away American naturalrights morality. In academia, the decisive break between American
natural-rights morality and the instrumentalist and utilitarian
approaches that inform American law now took place between
251 Compare, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-ObligationNorm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 745, 753-73 (2009) (promoting fine-grained virtuebased approaches to property law), and Eduardo Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 821, 860-86 (2009) (same), with Claeys, supra note 238, at 916-22 (challenging such approaches and preferring private ordering instead), and Henry E. Smith,
Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American PropertyLaw, 94
CORNELL L. REv. 959, 963-80 (2009) (same).
252 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 5, at 519.
253 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 520
(1945).
254 Id.
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roughly 1880 and 1920. In this period, prominent political and social
scientists discredited American natural-rights morality and propounded in its place new theories of democracy and administration.25 5 Most scholars who subscribed to this consensus agreed on a
more interventionist theory of government. They assumed that government was supposed to implement the general will of the electorate, and they then examined how law, administration, and other tools
of social control might implement that will most efficiently and
rationally.2 5 6
These trends influenced the academic study of tort at leading law
schools. During this period, social-science-trained legal academics
started to reconsider tort law in what Ernest Weinrib has described as
"instrumentalist" terms, by using policy-driven interest-balancing tests
to give specificity to tort's general moral claims.25 7 William Landes
and Richard Posner approvingly cite tort scholarship from this period
as "protoeconomic," and as important "[a]ntecedents of the positive
economic theory of [t]ort law."2 5 8
C.

Conceptual Property Theory

Another way to appreciate the shift is to compare the assumptions doctrine and accident and law and economics both make about
property. While the doctrine assumes that property refers to a wide
and integrated package of control, use, and disposition rights, accident law and economics presumes that property consists of a "bundle
of rights," and specifically a bundle that facilitates nominalist analysis
of property.

255 See., e.g, C. EDWARD MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 307
(1924) (describing an emerging consensus in which "the individualistic ideas of the
'natural right' school of political theory, indorsed in the Revolution, are discredited
and repudiated"); accord FRANK J. GooDNow, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION (1914);
Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. Sci. Q. 201 (1887), reprinted in
WOODROw WILSON: THE ESSENTIAL POLITICAL WRITINGS 231 (Ronald J. Pestritto ed.,
2005) [hereinafter WOODROW WILSON].
256 See, e.g., GOODNOW, supra note 255, at 17-19, 88-91; WOODROw WILSON, supra
note 255, at 240-45.

257 Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485, 486-88
(1989).
258 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 61, at 4 & nn.9-11 (citing OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 94-96 (1881)); James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22
HARv. L. REV. 97 (1908); Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1915)).
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While Legal Realism is difficult to pin down, 25 9 many important
projects associated with the Realists can be understood as efforts to
apply the general lessons of 1900-era political and social science to
American law. Realist property theory can certainly be understood as
such a project. For example, Realist economist Richard Ely says of the
labor theory of property expounded in Vanhorne's Lesse 2 60 : "It rests
upon an unscientific eighteenth century social philosophy of natural
rights existing prior to the formation of society and of a compact
whereby men left a state of nature .

. .

. All this has long ago been

totally discredited by science."2 61
The Realists therefore needed to revise property conceptual theory for substantive political reasons. The political assumptions
informing their conception of social science led them to believe that
resource uses could and needed to be managed by experts applying
"scientific" conceptions of social efficiency.2 62 If the concept "property" is a nominalist term-that is, if "property" refers to "that which
the law happens to call property in a particular case"-the term makes
it easier for experts to manage particular uses of property in particular
resource disputes without being constrained by the structure of
property.2 63
Different Realists propounded different theories. Some Realists
reconceived of property as a nominalist "bundle of rights." To be
sure, the "bundle of rights" metaphor predated the Realists and is not
necessarily tied to their political agenda. John Lewis used it in an eminent-domain treatise, for example, to explain why any restraint on the
259 For one contemporaneous attempt by a Realist to explain the core tenets of
Realism, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Respondingto Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
260 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
261 1 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DisnIBuTION or WEALTH 107 (1914); see also Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13
CORNELL L. Q. 8, 21 (1927) ("[B]ecause law has become more interested in defending property against attacks by socialists, the doctrine of natural rights has remained
in the negative state and has never developed into a doctrine of the positive contents
of rights.").
262 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-27
(1977) (contrasting "lay" and "scientific" understandings and suggesting it would be
better "to purge the legal language of all attempts to identify any particular person as
'the' owner of a piece of property").
263 See, e.g., Walton H. Hamilton & Irene Till, Property, in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 528 (1937) (defining property as "a euphonious collocation of letters
which serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the
commonwealth").
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free control, use, or disposition of property counted as a taking.2 6 4
Leading Realists, however, used the bundle metaphor as an apologetic
conceptual tool for political tendencies opposite Lewis's. These Realists appropriated Wesley Hohfeld's conceptual taxonomy (recounted
in Part III.B), to recast in rem claim rights of exclusive use determination into clusters of in personam privileges, to use or alienate assets
for specific purposes, in relation to particular claimants on the
asset.2 6 5 Thus, in a policy analysis of rate making, Realist economist
Robert Hale recasts the general "right of ownership in a manufacturing plant [into], to use Hohfeld's terms, a privilege to operate the
plant, plus a privilege not to operate it, plus a right to keep others from
operating it, plus a power to acquire all the rights of ownership in the
products."26 6 If the state significantly limits the owner's last power,
Hale implies, it still does not take property if it leaves the owner with
the first three privileges and rights.
This Realist bundle of rights conception is now the standard conceptual lens through which prominent judges and academics view
property in property torts. In the sparks case LeRoy Fibre, Justice
Holmes argued that the law should not categorically block contributory negligence from going to the jury but rather weigh the defense by
balancing minor "differences of degree" depending on where the
plaintiffs flax stacks were in relation to the defendant's train. 26 7 Two
decades later, the authors of the First Restatement of Torts restated nuisance law to suggest it turns on a balancing of the social policy values
promoted by the parties' land uses. 2 6 8 Coase assumed a similar view
in Social Cost, as suggested by this passage: "We may speak of a person
owning land and using it as a factor of production, but what the landowner in fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of
actions." 269 This viewpoint is now typical in accident law and econom264 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED
STATES § 55, at 43 (1888) ("The dullest individual among the people knows and understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights."). On the earliest reference
to the bundle metaphor, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 455
n.40 (1997).
265 See HOHFELD, supra note 139, at 65, 74-82.
266 Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L.
REv. 209, 214 (1922).
267 LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 353-54 (1914)
(Holmes, J., concurring).
268 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§§

826-28 (1934); see also Lewin, supra note

202, at 210-12 (explaining the reasons for and implications of the Restatement determining reasonableness by focusing on "utilitarian criteria aimed at promoting the
public good").
269 Coase, supra note 11, at 44.
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ics. For example, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen define property
"[from a legal viewpoint, ... [as] a bundle offights."2 70
This shift transforms American tort common law in the guise of
explaining it.271 In Hohfeldian terms, American natural-rights morality hardwires into the relevant common law an assumption that "use"
refers to in rem claim rights, 272 which protect in owners a liberty to
choose among many possible liberties how to use their land.
Although the legal tests canvassed in the last paragraph vary in different ways, all of them frame resource disputes as entitlement-allocation
decisions that could go either way. The landowner who otherwise
enjoys a claim right has the same liberties to use his land for single
purposes, but now subject to exposure that outside pollution or trespasses may disrupt those use-liberties. The various shifts described
above thus pit one liberty, corresponding to the owner's current use,
against another, corresponding to the neighbor's current use. The
liberties that correspond to land uses not currently practiced are
transferred to the trier of fact or the regulator. So are the policy control marked off by the owner's claim right and the owner's liberty to
choose among different use-liberties.
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have traced Realist bundle of
rights theory into contemporary law and economics. 27 3 Although their
diagnosis is instructive in many respects, it leaves one significant mistaken impression: that there is only one alternative to the Realists'
bundle of rights, namely a conception of property organized around
an in rem right to exclude. 2 74 As Part III explained, at common law,
the "right to exclude" is better understood as an owner's conceptual
interest in determining exclusively how her property may be used
combined with a substantive interest in using it productively as specified by natural-rights labor theory. Some Realists, however, recon270 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 21, at 74.
271 See also Penner, supra note 200, at 17 (concluding, after canvassing standard
accident law and economics treatments of nuisance, that, "as an analysis of the orders
judges actually make, this is really very strained").
272 Bounded, of course, by correlative in rem duties not to make unjustified
boundary invasions on neighbors' property.
273 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 363-65 (2001) (tracing the genesis of bundle of rights
theory); id. at 366-75 (documenting how Coase assumed bundle of rights theory as
his working conception of property); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights"PictureofProperty, 43 UCLA L. REv. 711 (1996); Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-DimensionalProperty
Rights, 29 Aiz. ST. L.J. 1075, 1078-80 (1996).
274 See Merrill & Smith, supranote 273, at 394 (describing land rights as a "right to
exclude a range of intrusions"); id. at 395-96 (describing trespass and some aspects of
nuisance law as taking an "exclusionary" approach).
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ceived of property as a negative and formal in rem right of exclusion.
According to this approach, property requires some minimal level of
in rem exclusion. As long as the owner is endowed with some general
right to blockade most strangers from some aspect of his control or
use of his asset, he has property-even if the state limits his control,
use, or disposition in relation to other individuals with claims on the
asset.2 75
Merrill and Smith's account compresses the differences between
these alternatives and favors the Realist one. 276 As relevant to the
land-use torts covered in this Article, a formal right to exclude gives
an owner property in a prima facie right to recover if a stranger trespasses. But it does not guarantee him property-rule protection against
the trespass, and it does not guarantee him exclusive use of his property through doctrines of nuisance and negligence. 27 7 Similarly, if the
right to exclude is understood too formalistically, it explains easy trespass cases but not animal or overflight cases, and not why remedies
vary between accidental and intentional trespasses. 2 78 A formal right
to exclude explains why nuisance protects against heavy pollution, but
not perfectly, and it cannot explain spite-fence or ground-support
cases.2 79
Nevertheless, Merrill and Smith are quite right to suggest that
Realist bundle of rights property theory causes accident law and economics to misunderstand the "property" features of property torts. 280
Because it presumes that economic policy makers can resolve resource
disputes by maximizing productive efficiency, accident law and economics assumes that property control and use rights refer to not to
275 See Cohen, supranote 261, at 12 ("The law does not guarantee me the physical
or social ability of actually using what it calls mine .... But the law of property helps
me directly only to exclude others from using the things which it assigns to me."); see
also Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERs L. REV. 357, 370 (1954)
(concluding that "ownership is a particular kind of legal relation in which the owner
has a right to exclude the non-owner from something or other").
276 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 273, at 362-64 & nn.13, 14, 19, 20, 27, 28
(treating the substantive theories of property as understood by Blackstone and Adam
Smith as functionally interchangeable with the right to exclude view adopted by Realists Ely, Morris Cohen, and Felix Cohen).
277 For more comprehensive diagnoses of the limitations of right to exclude theory, see Claeys, supra note 128, at 631-49; Mossoff, supra note 127, at 375-76, 408 &
n.150.
278 See supra Part III.B.2, F.3.
279 See supra Part IIl.F.2.
280 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 273, at 391-94 (criticizing law and economics' "causal agnosticism").
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spheres of freedom but rather to individualized use claims by competing resource users.
D.

Normative Assumptions About Social Control

These conceptual issues set up the fundamental normative question: whether accident law and economics prescribes normatively
more desirable results in land-use torts than does the common political morality internal to the cases. The following discussion will not be
exhaustive. 28 1 But generally speaking, productive efficiency may be
attractive in theory and unattainable in practice. According to American natural-rights morality and students of Hayek, 282 productive efficiency often requires information too costly or volatile to use in
practice, and it often abstracts away from other factors important in
property regulation.2 8 3
Let us start with precaution and accident costs. It is quite often
hard in advance to predict what accident loss L will follow if no one
takes precautions, and harder to predict how much any precaution
will reduce the risk of accident p at the margins. In a Rylands-style
case about a mine shaft full of water, the mine owner has wide discretion over what kinds of material to use to build a dam, how high to
build the dam, and so forth. In advance, it is hard to forecast precisely
how much different constructions, shapes, and heights will floodproof the mine, or how much extra overflow different dams will pre281 Among many other complications, some of the issues discussed below bleed
into remedy questions that exceed the scope of this Article. The foundational treatment remains Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1106-07 (1972); for
different applications of Calabresi's and Melamed's foundations, see Richard A.
Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J.
2091 (1997); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of
Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075 (1980).
282 See, e.g., CORDATo, supranote 37, at 4 (stating that first, "market activity should
be analyzed as a dynamic, disequilibrium process," second, "the concepts of value and
utility are strictly subjective and therefore unobservable and unmeasurable (radical
subjectivism)," and third, "knowledge of market phenomena ... is always imperfect").
In theory, Cordato's second proposition makes personal value more subjective than
most sources in the American natural-rights tradition would probably allow. In practice, the two approaches are quite close. American natural-rights morality presumes
that individual uses and needs vary too much to allow for party-specific regulation,
and reverses that presumption only when land uses strongly suggest otherwise as
explained supra Part III.F.
283 See, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFsTRA L. REv. 641, 642
(1980) (suggesting that standard law and economic claims for common law efficiency
make "information requirements ... well beyond the capacity of the courts or anyone
else").
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vent. A regulator can posit that there are only two possible dam
designs and then plug in assumed p and L figures for these dams,28 4
but these assumptions are just simplifying assumptions. Then, since
the parties are selfish and each can respond to the other's behavior,
the regulator must then forecast how each party may react strategically to precautions by the other.2 8 5 Perhaps the neighbor at the bottom of the shaft should consider moving her house or building a
breakwater; but perhaps she builds a bigger house after the mine
owner builds a better dam. Most accident law and economists agree
that the resolution of these problems varies on many factors specific
to the parties,2 8 6 but the scholarship does not come to any single resolution. 287 It may not be possible to identify any level of precautions on
both sides that simultaneously minimizes excessive precaution spending in the short term and moral hazards in the long term.2 8 8 But it
expects much from a jury or judge to expect them to consider all the
relevant short-run factors, let alone balance the short-run ones with
the long-run ones.
Turn to the parties' production functions. Many accident law
and economic treatments illustrate general principles with charts or
tables showing how much each extra increment of production by one
party increases that party's profits and the other party's likely losses.
In Social Cost, Coase refutes Pigou by drawing out the consequences
that follow when one daily train generates $150 revenue at $50 cost,
and a second $100 additional revenue at $50 additional cost.28 9 These
sorts of examples usually presume that the fact finder can know each
party's production function accurately and instantaneously. 29 0 Yet
284 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 78, at 31-33 & tbl.1; see also LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 61, at 38 & tbl.2.2 (assuming railroad profits and farmer damages in a
sparks case depending on whether the farmer leaves a firebreak).
285 See PoLINSKY, supra note 28, at 18; Steven Shavell, Torts in Which Victim and
InjurerAct Sequentially, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 589, 592-98 (1983).
286 See supra note 71.
287 Compare LANDES & POSNER, supra note 61, at 90 (suggesting, on the facts of a
sparks case, that the farmer should not be forced to take precautions except when the
railroad's sparks are "very conspicuous"), with Grady, supra note 13, at 19-25 & tbl.1
(suggesting that sparks cases be sorted by the extent to which different parties fall
into each of six different precaution traps).
288 See James M. Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection in the Economic
Analysis of Tort Law, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 255, 260-61.
289 See Coase, supra note 11, at 31-33; see also PoLINSKv, supra note 28, at 17 & tbl.1
(presenting hypothetical data about party profits and damages in a pollution-nuisance
case).
290 See Hayek, supra note 253, at 521-22 (suggesting that economic methodology
undervalues "the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place").
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E.C. Pasour suggests that "[t]he real world never contains an entity
corresponding to the marginal-cost curve, since the amount of product that a firm will try to produce at any given price depends on many
factors including length of run, technology, and expected input
prices." 29 1 So whenever economic analysis presents such cost-revenue
functions, the lawyer should discount them substantially to account
for the slippage between an economic hypothetical and the uncertainty of a real-life lawsuit.
Separately, "productive efficiency" is usually construed to assume
perfect competition.2 9 2 When the rancher's cattle trample the
farmer's crops, Coase assumes the first causes $1 marginal extra
annual crop damage, the second $2, the third $3, and the fourth
$4.293 For the purposes of developing his economic critique of Pigou,
Coase's numbers and market assumptions are not controversial. But
when Coase's analysis is turned around to study legal entitlements, it
is very controversial to assume that the extra crop damage per steer
may be accurately described by one number and not two or three. To
be comprehensive, a regulator would need to discern how the rancher
values the crop damage, how the farmer values it, and maybe also
what figure the market sets as a replacement price for crops. Coase's
function assumes that the farmer and the rancher value the crop damage at the market price. In practice, it is possible if not likely that the
farmer and rancher value the crops extremely differently from each
other and the market-replacement price. 2 94 Accident law and economic scholarship does recognize the problem of subjective valuation.
Some scholarship worries that damage rules short-change subjective
values, 295 while others worry that subjective valuation encourages parties to hold out 2 9 6 and expect that liability rules circumvent this danger. 2 9 7 But if heterogeneous property uses are the norm and not the
exception, the law should worry far more about the former possibility
than the latter.
291 E.C. Pasour,Jr., Monopoly Theory and Practice-Some Subjectivist Implications: Comment on ODhiscol4 in METHOD, PROCESS, AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMIcs 215, 218 (Israel M.
Kirzner ed., 1982).
292 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 11, at 18, 30.
293 See id. at 41.
294 See, e.g., CORDATO, supra note 37, at 6-7, 58, 97; 2 F.A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION & LIBERTY 113 (1976); D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15J. LEGAL SToD. 263,
269 (1986).
295 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 281, at 2093.
296 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1982).
297 See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 28, at 21-23.
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Let us turn from productive efficiency to transaction costs. Robert Ellickson has helpfully subdivided transaction costs into gettogether costs (the search costs of finding a bargaining or disputing
partner), execution costs (the costs of consummating a bargain), and
information costs. 298 The party-valuation problems just described can
create substantial execution costs, and empirical uncertainty about
the parties' production functions and costs can generate information
costs. But there are other serious sources of transaction costs-particularly associated with third parties.
To this point, I have assumed, as Coase's hypotheticals all do, that
the economist is trying to maximize wealth in a bilateral dispute
between two present and established land users. As more owners
become parties to a resource dispute, they increase holding out and
free-riding. These coordination costs can simplify economic analysis.
In some circumstances, such costs counsel strongly in favor of
assigning liability in the manner most likely to circumvent the coordination costs. 299 At the same time, multiplicity creates other complications if one zooms away from the immediately affected parties to
strangers who need to live under the precedents set by particular
cases. Among other things, as Merrill and Smith have shown, society
suffers significant third-party information costs if basic property liability doctrines are fine-grained. Strangers to property must then process all the data specific to individual assets to know their rights and
liabilities.30 0 Sparks cases presumed railroads liable and limited plaintiffs'-misconduct defenses to avoid such complications along railroad
lines. Similar concerns are equally important in most simple trespass
and pollution-nuisance fact patterns.
The relevant liability rules must also consider how land-use decisions made in one year will affect planning in the neighborhood
twenty years later. On a coming to the nuisance fact pattern, it is costprohibitive for a factory owner to find all the likely residents in the
neighborhood twenty years later. Maybe he can find and bargain with
their current predecessors in interest. But in a world of scarce information, the present owners' forecasts may be haphazard. The more
often neighborhood conditions change the more frequently later parties will need to renegotiate.3 0 ' Economic analysis could suggest that
the efficient response is to let the factory establish a footprint in the
298 Ellickson, supra note 36, at 614-16.
299 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 281, at 1115-19; Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts
and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991).
300 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 273, at 394-97.
301 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 21, at 86.
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neighborhood and clarify everyone's rights in the process. 0 2 It could
suggest that, ex ante, there is no one-size-fits-all efficient solution.3 0 3
But it could also suggest that, because the early parties cannot bargain
with the highest value users likely to appear twenty years later, "ex
ante anonymity" may encourage them excessively to discount the
interests of late-comers and overinvest in polluting activities.30 4
Although coming to the nuisance cases highlight these informational
challenges vividly, the challenges exist in principle in any changing
neighborhood.
The difficulties covered thus far make it hard to identify the productively-efficient outcome focusing only on the parties directly interested in the outcome of a resource dispute. But to measure social
welfare really comprehensively, a policymaker must also subtract from
net social welfare administrative costs, the "public and private costs of
getting information, negotiating, writing agreements and laws, policing agreements and rules, and arranging for the execution of preventive measures."3 0 5
One such administrative cost relates to the robustness of markets.
By and large, productive-efficiency analysis anticipates what a market
would do, discounts for transaction costs, and either nudges the parties toward a bargain or replicates the bargain they should have
attained.30 6 In doing so, productive-efficiency analysis assumes that
legal doctrine does not shape the parties' preferences for market bargaining. Here is another assumption that can be reasonably questioned. Take train-sparks cases. The rule barring contributory
negligence seems harsh, for it seems to encourage farmers to plant as
close as they want to tracks. The authorities that favor contributory
negligence on this ground30 7 assume the law can maximize the joint
value of the farmer's crops and the railroads operations without destabilizing general perceptions about property rights, markets, and litigation. Perhaps. But if contributory negligence typically goes to the
jury, the law discourages railroads from settling up front. It encourages them instead to run their spark-emitting trains, make farmers litigate, and then settle at a discount. So perhaps contributory
negligence decreases social welfare in the long run even if it increases
302 See Baxter & Altree, supranote 60, at 17-28; Wittman, supranote 61, at 560-61.
303 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 61, at 632.
304 See Rohan Pitchford & Christopher M. Snyder, Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysisfrom an Incomplete ContractsPerspective, 19 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 491, 494-97
(2003).
305 Ellickson, supra note 67, at 689.
306 See Cooter, supra note 296, at 14-27.
307 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 41, § 13.1, at 336.
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joint party welfare in the short run. Or, even if contributory negligence increases social welfare in both the short and long runs in
sparks cases, perhaps it confuses the tort system generally about how
boundaries work in land-use torts like nuisance. These various economic costs are considered more explicitly in economic scholarship
on the public use doctrine in eminent domain and the choice
between property and liability rules.3 0 8 In principle, however, they are
also relevant to the basic rules of liability in the common law land-use
torts.
Finally, if parties shift from bargaining to litigating or lobbying,
they seek rent, and the costs of rent dissipation need to be subtracted
from net social welfare as well. Maybe land-owning parties will seek
rent in legislative and administrative settings no matter how basic
common law liability rules are assigned. But maybe individual economic behavior, while basically selfish, is at least partially teachable.
Then different legal regimes may encourage litigation, lobbying, or
interest-group politics to different degrees. A comprehensive account
of social efficiency must therefore determine with practical certainty
to what extent different legal regimes encourage gainful production
or rent dissipation.
E. A Simpler Alternative?
Take all these factors together, and it is plausible to wonder
whether accident law and economics invites information overload.
The informational demands seem even more severe when one recalls
that productive-efficiency analysis focuses, as section IV.C showed, on
individualized use liberties. In Economic Analysis of Law, Richard Posner presumes, on one hand, that property law can and should first
"parcel[ ] out mutually exclusive rights to the use of particular
resources," and then, on the other hand, that tort and other bodies of
law can reconfigure those rights when "giving someone the exclusive
right to a resource may reduce rather than increase efficiency."so09 But
suppose that land is used in conditions of uncertainty, with diverse
and selfishly-driven uses, in which temporary resolutions of use conflicts can change suddenly. If these generalizations are tolerably accurate, it is unrealistic to expect that a trier of fact can simultaneously
secure investment and maximize welfare in property.
The tough-minded response is instead to limit the project of welfare improvement substantially. The basic land-use torts should then
308 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNEu. L. REV. 61,
88-89 (1986).
309 POSNER, supra note 14, § 3.1, at 32, 34.
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push policy control down to the individuals who have the best localized knowledge and incentives to use it productively.3 10 Boundary-like
protections serve this goal in tort.3 1 1 Such rules (and strict liability,
and the choice to limit plaintiffs'-misconduct defenses) guarantee in a
clear and determinate way that owners will have some security that
their chosen uses will not be disrupted in the likeliest invasive ways. 3 12
Seen in reverse, those rules also limit owners' attempts to hijack or
blockade land uses by their neighbors when those uses hit the neighbors more where they live. These rules may also focus and stabilize
market and government processes. Because such control and use
rights make it easier for each party to predict its rights and duties
without inquiring or bargaining with neighbors, they simplify future
planning by one owner, bargaining among many owners, and factual
inquiries by triers of fact.
Of course, one may fairly question the behavioral generalizations
that lie under this alternative. These generalizations are empirical,
but in an extremely soft sense: the sense in which one makes "empirical" claims by observing, often anecdotally, a wide range of phenomena about human behavior and then drawing a few comprehensive
generalizations. The philosophical tradition in which Locke and The
Federalist operated presumed that such generalizations were the most
one could know about human "nature."3 13 That is why these and
other contributors to American natural-rights morality resisted the
temptation to explain law and politics with reference to mathematics.
Austrian economics makes generalizations on a similar basis. But the
underlying generalizations are falsifiable. In practice, they are
extremely hard to test; in principle, however, they may be inaccurate.
But this possibility applies equally to any mode of law and economic analysis. When accident law and economics focuses on the
most concrete and party-specific factors, it assumes implicitly but
empirically that law and economics can maximize the joint product of
310 See Hayek, supra note 253, at 524 ("If we can agree that the economic problem
of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances
of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to
the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them.").
311 I assume here that the theoretical differences between negligence and strict
liability, discussed supraPart III.C, do not matter practically. If negligence law focuses
entirely on the railroad's conduct, the focus of the inquiry and the burden-shifting
presumptions available in negligence will tend to make the railroad liable in cases
where the railroad cannot prove it took reasonable precautions.
312 This security cannot be complete without the right remedial rules, a full discussion of which (again, see supra note 281) exceeds the scope of this Article.
313 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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the parties and social welfare generally without seriously threatening
investment, creating information-cost problems, encouraging rentseeking, or demoralizing markets. Accident law and economic analysis may consider these more systematic issues as part of an all-the-circumstances analysis. In an all-the-circumstances analysis, however, the
party-specific factors are likely to seem concrete and immediate, while
the social factors are more likely to seem diffuse and remote. Tacitly,
such an analysis assumes that the party-specific factors should weigh
about as much as the more systematic factors. Such an approach is
misguided if the most concrete and party-specific factors are the least
relevant and the least concrete but most social factors are most
relevant.
The important point here is that these various assumptions are
empirical, and they are foundational "meta-economic" assumptions
about human behavior.3 1 4 In crucial respects, these meta-assumptions
do more work than concrete numbers or productive-efficiency equations do in accident law and economic analysis. These assumptions do
not provide definitive answers, but they do focus economic analysis on
questions capable of definitive answers. Important here, these metaassumptions resemble the broad generalizations that ethical and political philosophy and Austrian economics make about human nature
more than they do the more concrete numbers and production functions on which accident law and economics purports to focus. Until
accident law and economics defends those meta-assumptions, no one
can say convincingly that it operates on foundations sound enough to
justify its reputation for determinacy.
My criticisms of accident law and economics should not be understood as wholesale criticisms of economics or law and economics. I
find much commendable and instructive, for example, in law and economics scholarship on land use torts by Richard Epstein and Henry
Smith.3 1 5 I have some reservations whether their interpretations of
the relevant doctrines can be confirmed empirically without piggybacking on the natural-rights morality internal to American property law,3 16 but their economic justifications for the doctrines are
surely plausible on their own. Here, it suffices to recall two points.
First, as Smith himself has already noted, "utilitarian and libertarian
or corrective justice accounts of nuisance law [are] closer to each
314 I am grateful to Lloyd Cohen for suggesting this phrase.
315 See supra Parts IV.C-D.
316 See Eric R. Claeys, The Right to Exclude in the Shadow of the Cathedral: A Response
to Parchomovsky and Stein, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQuy 262 (2010), http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2010/4/index.html.

2010]

JEFFERSON MEETS COASE

1445

other than previously thought."3 1 7 Second, Epstein and Smith, like
Austrian economists, set the ambitions of law and economics considerably lower than do scholars of accident law and economics. Their
moderation in the face of information problems makes their interpretations and justifications of doctrine more tentative and intuitive-but
it also confirms this Article's basic point: when law and economic analysis proceeds mindful of its limitations, it does not have the advantages of definiteness or precision it is conventionally assumed to have
over moral philosophy.
CONCLUSION

Coase assumed in Social Cost that "problems of welfare economics
must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals."3 18 Welfare economics tends to focus more on questions that lend themselves
to mathematical analysis, while aesthetics and morals tend to focus on
questions shot through with opinion. That difference gives welfare
economics more concreteness and determinacy in its sphere than aesthetics and morals have in theirs. Over the last generation, however, a
prominent group of law and economists have tried to export the
determinacy of welfare economics into law, and particularly parts of
law raising issues properly in the province of morality. The most
important question about that project is whether law and economics
can have it both ways-whether it can keep all the determinacy of
welfare economics without bogging the economics down in the indeterminacy of the parts of human life caught up in moral opinion.
This Article has shown that the economic tort scholarship in
question cannot explain basic features of prima facie liability and
affirmative defenses in trespass to land, nuisance, and land-based negligence. Of course, the common law land-use torts represent just one
slice of doctrines. All the same, economic tort scholarship has
assumed it can explain these doctrines. And to the extent that these
doctrines are representative, prominent economic torts scholars have
pushed law and economics beyond its bounds.
Readers may reasonably wonder why these contrasts have not
been discussed in significant detail in previous legal scholarship.
There are surely a number of answers; this Article has suggested three.
First, American natural-rights morality has been in desuetude in the
American legal academy for a long time. This Article has taken one
small step toward filling that void, by showing how American naturalrights morality justifies doctrine in land-use torts.
317
318

Smith, supra note 42, at 1049.
Coase, supra note 11, at 43.
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Second, at a high level of generality, philosophical tort scholarship has tended to focus more on the ways in which the tort system
instantiates corrective justice than on the ways in which it borrows on
political morality to inform rights and duties. This Article has pushed
back against that tendency. It has shown how tort's corrective commitments take shape when informed by American natural-rights
morality's justification for owners' moral possessory interests in control and use of their land.
Most important, mainline segments of economic tort scholarship
view resource disputes through a conceptual framework that makes
expert-driven policy analysis seem feasible and attractive. These segments have created an impression that law and economics explains
tort more determinately than other approaches to the law. But if the
land-use torts provide a fair test case, these rumors of superior determinacy are greatly exaggerated.

